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The findings are based on a study titled “Competition Clauses in Bilateral Trade Treaties: 
Analysing the Issues in the Context of India’s Future Negotiating Strategy”, undertaken 
by the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ICRIER), and 
commissioned by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) as part of the advocacy 
programme of CCI. The copyright of the study rests with the CCI. This is being 
published with the explicit consent of CCI.  
 
However, the views expressed herein should, in no way, be treated as official views of 
the Competition Commission of India or of its officials. 




Competition law is still in its infancy in India.  As the Indian Corporate Sector grows in 
stature, size and ambition, it will try to use all possible and permissible methods to 
expand and consolidate its position in the market.  This is entirely on expected lines.  At 
the same time, residents in these partner countries also have similar objectives to expand 
their reach and market share globally.  It is therefore important that Indian negotiators 
have a clear idea of regulatory provisions that are needed to ensure that competition 
forces do not become a victim of such corporate ambitions.  It is in this context that 
ICRIER has undertaken this study which is sponsored by the Competition Commission of 
India. The study breaks new grounds in trying to identify some competitive market.  I 








Director & Chief Executive 
 
 
February 22, 2008   
   iii
Competition Clauses in Bilateral Trade Treaties: Analysing the Issues in the Context of 









There is a recent trend towards trade agreements that include trade related competition 
provisions. However there are large differences across these trade agreements in terms of 
how the competition provisions are addressed. In this context, this research report tries to 
analyse the competition provisions in few selected FTAs and draw lessons for India, 
which is also following the path of entering into trade agreements. The analysis suggests 
that cooperation in implementing competition laws is immensely helpful. However, at 
this moment, India can follow the EU style of agreements with competition provisions 
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Executive Summary 
 
The motivation for including competition provisions in bilateral or regional trade 
agreements is to ensure that the gains from implementing such agreements are not 
undermined by anti-competitive private practices. However, the ability to draw firm 
inferences has been constrained due to the non availability of evidence on the operation 
of competition provisions in trade agreements. Also the analysis so far suggested that 
many forms of agreements on competition policies are possible. The trade agreements 
vary in terms of the kind of competition provisions included and implemented.    
 
Notwithstanding these limitations, it is quite evident that competition policy plays a very 
important complementary role to trade policy. As mentioned before, sound and effective 
competition law enforcement can ensure that the benefits of trade liberalisation are not 
defeated by the imposition of private barriers to trade. Also it is found in the literature 
that there are two sets of competition provisions that can be found in RTAs. Provisions 
that provide for harmonization of competition rules of the contracting parties, and/or 
provisions that provide for cooperation on competition-related issues. EU bilateral 
agreements are the main examples of RTAs that provide for harmonization of 
competition rules of the contracting parties. In contrast, bilateral RTAs signed by the US 
and Canada include provisions that provide for cooperation on competition matters 
(Holmes et al., 2005).   
 
However, the analysis of various trade agreements and evidence from literature suggested 
that the harmonization clauses which require reduction of existing diversity in various 
domestic competition laws cannot be achieved.  However the soft laws on cooperation, 
including any procedures for consultations, notification, or comity are found to be useful 
for enhancing cooperation among the competition agencies while dealing with 
anticompetitive practices.   
 
With the above backdrop, the study suggests, India could also be benefited by including 
competition clauses in its future trade agreements. As discussed earlier, India’s trade 
agreements don’t include a separate chapter on competition clause though certain 
provision are present in other non competition specific chapters of some trade 
agreements. And in deciding about the type of provisions India should focus more on 
clauses related to cooperation such as notification, consultation and comity. The 
provision related to harmonization of competition laws should not be tried as many 
countries (at least in the developing world) don’t yet have domestic competition laws. 
Also India’s competition law itself was recently introduced and is yet to be judged about 
its efficacy in preventing anticompetitive practices.   
 
However it is also recognized that differences which may arise in the regulation of anti-
competitive conduct across borders can lead to distortions in the trading system. A policy 
solution to this is the extraterritorial application of competition laws by one country over 
firms in the jurisdiction of another country. Though this helps in curbing anticompetitive   v
practices, at the same time raises various legal, political and administrative difficulties. 
Therefore the success in extraterritorial application of competition laws is hard to achieve 
without having the cooperation of the foreign governments or the ability to access 
information relevant to the case. Therefore incorporating clauses related to cooperation 
and exchange of information can contribute to the realization of the benefits of trade 
liberalisation. In addition, the potential for trade disputes could be reduced through 
consultations. Greater attentions should be placed on the comity principles for resolving 
conflicts arising from the resulting overlaps in jurisdictions  
 
Information sharing is very important when seeking a more effective regime for co-
operation between countries regarding cross-border competition cases. However, in most 
trade agreements the exchange of information is restricted to non-confidential 
information. And this greatly limits the potential utility of these exchanges. Effective 
enforcement of competition laws would be facilitated by exchange of confidential 
information. Therefore appropriate mechanisms should be developed for sharing 
confidential information. Such mechanisms already exist in many other policy fields like 
money laundering and securities regulations.  So India should focus on the sharing of 
confidential information in its future trade negotiations.   
 
In order to enhance the prospects of success, India should work towards agreements that 
commit the signatories to adopt and implement competition laws having an international 
dimension and agreeing to the cooperation and information sharing protocols. 
   vi
Guidelines in Inclusion of Competition Clauses in RTAs 
 
 
1.  In setting out these guidelines two issues have been kept in mind. One, that 
the issue of competition clauses may vary depending on whether the RTA is 
with a developing or developed country. Given India’s very limited 
experience with its own Competition Act, it’s approach in RTAs with 
developed countries would be necessarily defensive. Second, in RTAs with 
developing countries (which now dominate in numbers) a more aggressive 
approach might be recommended. 
2.  In general, competition clauses would stress on the need for cooperation, 
consultation, positive comity, transparency and dispute settlement.  
3.  Cooperation would entail obtaining information sharing in assessing any 
abuse of dominance of one country’s entity in the other country. 
4.  Cooperation in the context of developed country RTAs should also include 
technical assistance ( in training of officials, workshops, experience sharing 
etc) for building up India’s capacity in competition enforcement and advocacy 
and exchange of confidential information. 
5.  The focus of the agreements would be on preventing non-governmental hard 
core cartels and cooperation could extend to assessing the impacts (effects 
doctrine) of third party (especially developed country) export cartels. Here 
provision on consultation would be particularly useful. 
6.  Transparency clauses are useful in all RTAs. This should mainly relate to 
wide dissemination of information on all laws, rules and guidelines governing 
commerce in the RTA members. 
7.  Currently, WTO provision on national Treatment (NT) exists in most RTAs. 
But these generally apply only to goods trade. Given India’s interest in service 
trade, current treatment of NT is of little use. Since the NT provisions in the 
proposed GATS are still under discussion, no NT provisions should be 
committed to in negotiations. 
8.  Specific provisions regarding competition in service trade can be taken from 
Article 7.12 and 7.13 of the CECA with Singapore.  
9.  In discussions in RTAs the application to government monopolies should be 
avoided.  
10.  Similarly, issues of competition policy regarding state aid should also be left 
alone. 
11.  In general, it is in India’s interest to follow the EU model which focuses on 
cooperation rather than the US model which emphasizes substantive rules. In 
other words, excessive presence of competition provision via many, specific 
clauses should be avoided. 1   
Competition Clauses in Bilateral Trade Treaties: Analysing the Issues in the Context of 





In recent years, countries across the globe have been engaging in trade agreements at 
bilateral and regional level to forge deeper economic relations. Conventional bilateral 
agreements focused on removal of tariff barriers and wider markets for goods. However, 
in recent years, there is a trend towards agreements that include a broader list of trade-
related issues: trade in services, investment, intellectual property, trade facilitation, 
competition, and so on.
1 Competition policy and its related aspects have become relevant 
today because with the inflow of foreign products and companies there are new 
challenges such as anti-competitive behaviour by Multi-national Corporations (MNCs) 
and international cartels. In such a scenario, incorporating competition issues in bilateral 
agreements/ Free Trade Agreement (FTAs) ensures that anti-competitive business 
practices do not hinder market access and dilute the benefits of such bilateral 
agreements.
2     
 
India is also following the same path of entry into bilateral FTA/PTA as evidenced by 
Indo- Sri Lanka, Indo-Chile, Indo-Bhutan, Indo-Thai FTA and Singapore Comprehensive 
Economic Co-operation Agreement. Several more are in the making such as Indo-
ASEAN, SAFTA, Indo-Gulf Co-operation Council, etc.
3 These agreements have focused 
on elimination of tariff barriers, co-operation in financial services, investment and other 
areas of economic co-operation to ensure greater market access for India’s goods and 
services through preferential deals. India has been fairly cautious in excluding 
competition provisions in its bilateral treaties. However, increasingly there is a feeling 
that issues such as market domination and role of Competition Commission should also 
                                                 
1 NAFTA, MERCUSOR were some of the earliest trade agreements covering wide range of issues such as 
trade in goods and services, intellectual property, investment, government procurement, free movement 
of business people, competition, and a dispute settlement mechanism. 
2 In particular, of the around 300 bilateral and regional trade agreements (RTAs) in force or in negotiation, 
over 100 include competition-policy related provisions. UNCTAD (2005) 
3 This is not an exhaustive list. At present Indfia has or is negotiating about 20 RTAs. 2   
be included in these bilateral treaties. This is considered important for providing a level 
playing field for Indian firms either exporting or investing in the partner country markets. 
Thus at this juncture, while it is important to study the potential costs and benefits of 
entering into an FTA, it is also necessary that the competition clauses in bilateral trade be 
given a much closer examination to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and 
threats arising from including competition policy in FTAs.  In view of this further 
research and analysis on the role that competition law and policy plays in these 
agreements is warranted. 
 
2. Objective and Approach of Study 
 
The aim of this study is to provide an assessment of the competition provisions 
incorporated in the free trade agreements and their relevance for India. It also seeks to 
assess the feasibility of including competition related provisions in India’s future trade 
treaties.  
 
In the course of the study it was found that existing literature only deals with the 
incorporation of competition provisions in trade agreements and there is very little 
empirical research on the effectiveness of competition provisions and their impact on 
trade. Therefore to understand the importance, effectiveness and impact of these 
provisions intensive discussions were held with academicians and key government 
officials from the Ministry of Commerce, Government of India, Ministry of Trade and 
Industry-Government of Singapore and Competition Commission of Singapore. In 
addition discussions were held with members from the American Chamber of Commerce 
in Singapore and Singapore Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Singapore was 
chosen for the field study as it has incorporated competition provisions in its bilateral 
trade agreements.  
3. Structure of the Study 
 
The structure of the study is as follows. Section II provides an overview of competition 
policy. Section III analyses the relationship between trade and competition policy. 3   
Specific competition provisions in bilateral trade agreements are analysed in section IV. 
The FTA case studies are discussed in section V. Presence of competition provisions in 
the non-competition specific chapters are discussed in section VI. Some evidences of the 
enforcement of competition provisions are highlighted in section VII. The case for India 
is presented in section VIII. Section IX concludes the study. 
 
II. Competition Policy Overview 
1. Concept and Definition 
 
The concept of “competition” can be traced back to Adam Smith’s book on ‘The Wealth 
of Nations’. According to Smith, competition  drives economies to produce best 
outcomes. An ADB report (2005) suggests that competition in product and factor markets 
is crucial to achieve high rates of economic growth and employment. Economic theory 
also suggests that competition is beneficial as it gives a wider choice to consumers and 
provides sellers with stronger incentive to minimize costs. Lewis (2004) says that 
competition is usually not intense and not equal for reasons of special interests, big 
government and citizen’s weak economic understanding. Also markets can not be 
competitive due to anti competitive practices of the firms where anti competitive or 
unfair business practices are those which limit other enterprises from entering a market or 
which regulate supply in a way that is deemed harmful either to other existing or 
potential producers and consumers. Such practices include predatory pricing behaviour, 
collusion, mergers and acquisitions etc.  
 
Given the importance of competition to an economy’s growth and development, policies 
to promote competition have become an important element of policy formulation. 
Arguments have been put forward to adopt open market policies to increase competition. 
In the past many countries adopted economic reforms and reduced government 
intervention. Many reforms were undertaken in the form of reduction of trade barriers, 
privatisation et cetera to increase competition. It is however possible that, firms may try 
to eliminate competition by adopting anti competitive practices such as cartels. Hence 
there is a need for government intervention to protect competition by prohibiting 4   
agreements and activities that undermine it. The government intervention in this case 
takes the form of a competition policy.  
 
Competition policy generally refers to a set of government measures such as trade 
liberalisation policy, economic deregulation and privatisation and competition laws that 
affect the behavior of enterprises. It is seen as a set of laws and regulations to maintain a 
fair degree of competition by eliminating restrictive business practices of private 
enterprises (Milberg, 2002). Competition law is therefore seen as a subset of competition 
policy or an instrument of competition policy. It represents a code of conduct in the 
economic arena which is aimed at limiting excessive market power as manifested in 
cartels, restrictive business practices and abuse of market power.  
 
2. Relevance of Competition Policy 
 
There have been some arguments against of the need for a  domestic competition law. 
Harberger (1954) and Baumal (1982) argued that economic inefficiency resulting from 
monopoly is very small and therefore adoption of competition policy is not required. 
Similarly Bhagawati (1965) presented a model in which a domestic monopolist loses all 
its market power when barriers to trade are relaxed and the economy trades with a 
perfectly competitive world market. This implies that international trade policy can act as 
a substitute for competition policy. However, this is only true even in the neo-classical 
trade theory framework for a small economy which cannot influence the world prices. In 
general large economies ( for example, India in some services and agricultural 
commodities) do influence world prices either as buyers or as sellers in the world market. 
 
However over the years it was found that the economic welfare losses associated with 
monopoly and imperfections of competition may be greater than Harberger’s estimates. 
And trade policy fails to act as a perfect substitute for competition policy as trade policy 
focuses on the removal of barriers to international trade through tariff reduction and 
cannot be effective in domestic markets which are not strongly influenced by 
international trade. It is also viewed that danger to competition may come from 
international trade itself. For example international cartels may divide up markets through 5   
price fixing and on the basis of geographic market sharing. Therefore an increasing 
number of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements have demonstrated the need to 
reconcile national competition policies. Similarly, Anderson and Jenny (2003) feel that 
competition policy is more important for developing countries as they believe that less 
mature markets are more vulnerable to anticompetitive practices. The reasons they give 
are (i) high natural entry barriers due to inadequate business infrastructure and intrusive 
regulatory regimes; (ii) asymmetries of information in both product and credit markets; 
and (c) a greater proportion of local (non-tradable) markets. Therefore they suggest that 
developing countries need to be protected against cartels, monopoly abuses and the 
creation of new monopolies through mergers. Khemani and Dutz (1996) states that 
competition policy can help bring other related policy and legal reforms which are 
necessary for creating a healthy market economy. This requirement of an institutional 
mechanism in implementing even a perfectly competitive economy is now well 
recognized in the economic literature. 
 
The competition laws were adopted for the first time by Canada (1889) and US (1890) in 
response to concerns about the excessive market power. These laws were formulated 
during a period of unprecedented corporate mergers and acquisitions activity and the 
formation of cartels (M Lee and C Morand, 2003). But now in an era of increasing 
economic reforms and globalization an effective competition law is becoming recognized 
as a critical element in strengthening market forces. Since 1985 almost 90 countries have 
now adopted national competition laws. While traditionally competition laws have been 
present only in developed countries, a large number of developing and emerging 
economies have now adopted domestic competition laws.  Thus, since about 1990, almost 
80 developing countries have implemented or are in the process of implementing 
competition laws ( see, Singh, Ajit 2002, “Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging 
Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions.” G-24 Discussion Paper Series, UNCTAD 
and Centre for International Development Harvard University, No. 18.) A survey of the national 
competition polices indicates that competition policies vary across the world. There is 
also a conflict between the working of a sectoral regulator ( in telecommunications. 
Power etc) and the overall regulator like the Competition Commissions in various 
countries. The resolution of this conflict is usually a function of the dominance of 6   
consumer or producer interests in the political economy of a country. Thus, ff in the US 
the focus is on the anti trust actions, in the EU competition policy tries to promote 
economic integration and the national policies of the individual countries. In Japan the 
competition policy is closely linked with the industrial policy. Therefore Milberg (2002) 
again suggests that a country should be able to regulate competition policy  compatible 
with its long term development strategy.  
 
In the literature it is suggested that the main goal of competition policy should be the 
promotion of economic efficiency. In this context, review of various competition laws 
indicate that they have been concerned with both private and government anticompetitive 
practices that affect the state of competition in markets. UNCTAD (2002) provides a list 
of firm’s actions that may fall within the purview of competition law. Some of the 
important actions are thus: 
•  Measures relating to agreements between firms in the same market to restrain 
competition. 
•  Measures relating to attempts by a large incumbent firm to independently 
exercise market power (sometimes referred as abuse of dominant position) 
•  Measure relating to firms that act collectively but in the absence of an explicit 
agreement between them, attempt to exercise market power (sometimes referred 
to collective dominance) 
•  Measures relating to attempts by a firm or firms to drive one more of their rivals 
out of market (e.g. by predatory price fixing) 
•  Measures relating to collaboration between firms for the purpose of research, 
development, testing, marketing and distribution of products. 
 
The list is not supposed to be an exhaustive one and some competition laws may include 
more actions. ADB (2005) also lists out four types of government interventions that fall 
outside of the competition laws such as: 
•  Most consumer protection laws such as those relating to faulty product, 
warrantees and misleading advertising; 7   
•  Trade laws such as laws on anti dumping and countervailing duties and measures 
to protect national industries against surge of imports; 
•  Government policies toward registration of new businesses and taxation and 
corporate governance oversight of existing businesses; and 
•  Most trade and FDI policies excluding policies towards mergers and acquisitions 
 
Domestic competition laws include / treat some of the above mentioned acts as 
anticompetitive practices. Again domestic competition laws do not cover all sectors of 
the economy. In some cases state owned firms are exempted by law from the fold of 
competition. In addition, many competition laws include provisions that allow a 
government or an independent agency to grant exemptions to firms and sectors after the 
competition law has been enacted.  
 8   
III. Competition Policy and Trade 
1. Link between Competition Policy and Trade 
 
It has been widely recognised that the ongoing growth of international trade is 
considerably driven by trade liberalisation. The lowering of trade barriers, developments 
in technology and communication have led to increasingly interdependent economies. In 
an environment where national trade barriers are falling, firms are trying to organise their 
operations in a global scale and in the process use some anticompetitive practices.  It is 
generally believed that the reduction of governmental barriers in trade negotiations get 
replaced through the trade restrictions and distortions resulting from practices of private 
enterprises. With the increasing integration of the world economy, through trade 
liberalisation and expansion of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), the anticompetitive 
activities of the firms acquire the transborder dimension affecting several countries and 
sometimes the whole world. This implies that effective competition law enforcement can 
ensure that the benefits of trade liberalisation don’t get distorted through private 
anticompetitive practices.  
 
However in case of the transnational effect of the anticompetitive activities (eg. export 
cartels) of the enterprises, it becomes almost impossible to undertake any enforcement 
activities against a foreign firm without the cooperation of the other county. The 
differences in competition law and policy among the countries in such situations make 
the implementation and enforcement of competition law and policy very difficult. As a 
result, there have been debates and discussions on international cooperation among 
trading nations relating to the implementation and enforcement of competition laws and 
policies. It is also argued by many (eg. Matsushita, 2003) that some degree of 
convergence and harmonisation of national laws is desirable for effective enforcement of 
competition laws. The next section deals with all the historical developments relating to 
the internationalization of competition laws.  
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2. Internationalization of Competition Laws: A brief History 
 
Discussions on international cooperation in competition laws date back to the Havana 
Charter of the unsuccessful International Trade Organisation (ITO) in 1948. The 
Havana Charter included an entire chapter (Chapter V) on the subject of restrictive 
business practices and requires the members to control anti competitive practices of an 
international nature. The objective of Chapter V was to ‘prevent, on the part of private 
or public commercial enterprises, business practices affecting international trade which 
restrain competition, limit access to markets, or foster monopolistic control, whenever 
such practices have harmful effects on the expansion of production or trade…’ 
4 The ITO 
was authorized to investigate any complaints which could not be resolved through 
consultation and was required to give recommendations for action.  
 
However, these provisions could not be included in GATT 1947 due to opposition from 
the members.  Since then there have been periodic efforts to revive the issue. In 1958, a 
Group of Experts was created to study the feasibility of including trade related 
competition provisions in the GATT framework. On the basis of the report of the Group 
of Experts, a Decision on Arrangements for Consultations on Restrictive Business 
Practices was adopted in 1960. The Decision recommends that, ‘at the request of any 
contracting party, a contracting party should enter into consultations on restrictive 
business Practices on a bilateral or multilateral basis as appropriate and if it agrees that 
such harmful effects are present, it should take such measures as it deems appropriate to 
eliminate these effects’.
5 These arrangements were invoked on three occasions in 1996, in 




The United Nations ‘the Set’ (the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and 
Rules for the control of Restrictive Business Practices, 1980) also refers to the need to ‘ 
ensure that restrictive business practices do not impede or negate the realization of 
                                                 
4 http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/havana.pdf 
5 http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/rbp1.pdf 
6 Bilal S and M Olarreaga, 1998 10   
benefits that should arise from the liberalisation of tariff and non tariff barriers affecting 
international trade’
7  and also requires the countries to take action in ‘a mutually 
reinforcing’ manner at the national, regional and international level to eliminate or 
effectively deal with such practices affecting international trade.  
 
The above discussion suggests that increased trade liberalisation and integration of global 
economy calls for international cooperation and coordination. There is the possibility of 
trade conflict due to incompetent national competition laws and policies. It was believed 
that strengthening of domestic anti trust policies and developing mutual trust through 
some common understanding of competition issues would promote greater world trade 
through the resolution of trade conflicts, the curbing of anti competitive practices and 
international cartels. Therefore in the 90s a growing number of countries are seeking to 
cooperate internationally either through regional, bilateral, plurilateral or multilateral 
frameworks.  
 
3. Proposals on Competition Provisions in the WTO 
 
3.1: Introduction 
Against the above discussed historical developments, proposals were made to establish an 
international regime for competition policy and include competition provisions in the 
WTO framework. Therefore in 1996, at the Singapore WTO Ministerial meeting, it was 
decided to begin work on competition policy and the Working Group on Interaction 
between Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP) was established to study the 
interaction between trade and competition policy. The Working Group was mandated to 
consider issues raised by members relating to the interaction between trade and 
competition policy and identify areas that might require further consideration in the WTO 
framework.  
 
At the fourth Ministerial Conference in Doha in 2001, it was decided that the Working 
Group would focus on clarification of specific issues spelled out in the Doha Declaration 
on the interaction between trade and competition policy. The issues as mentioned in 
                                                 
7 http://vi.unctad.org/temp/doc/principles_en.pdf 11   
paragraphs 23-25 of the Doha Declaration are (a) technical assistance and capacity 
building for developing countries; (b) core principles (non-discrimination, transparency 
and procedural fairness) in the enforcement of competition law; (c) provisions dealing 
with hard-core cartels; and (d) modalities for voluntary multilateral cooperation.  
 
A number of rationales for inclusion of competition policy in the WTO have been put 
forward in the literature and by the work of the Working Group. According to Clarke and 
Evenett (2003) in the presence of an established relationship among enforcement 
agencies, public announcement of cartel actions in one country encourage enforcement 
efforts in the other countries.  Also the information sharing among the countries 
facilitates the investigation and prosecution against international cartels. The Working 
Group suggests that cooperation at the multilateral level could be helpful in generating 
political support for the implementation of effective competition policies at the national 
level. It is also viewed that competition policy at the multilateral framework would 
strengthen the competition agencies of the developing countries and protect them from 




Box 1: Text of Doha Declaration 
“23. Recognizing the case for a multilateral framework to enhance the contribution of 
competition policy to international trade and development, and the need for enhanced 
technical assistance and capacity building in this area as referred to in paragraph 24, we agree 
that negotiations will take place after the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference on the 
basis of a decision to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that session on modalities of 
negotiations. 
 
24. We recognize the needs of developing and least-developed countries for enhanced support 
for technical assistance and capacity building in this area, including policy analysis and 
development so that they may better evaluate the implications of closer multilateral 
cooperation for their development policies and objectives, and human and institutional 
development. To this end, we shall work in cooperation with other relevant intergovernmental 
organisations, including UNCTAD, and through appropriate regional and bilateral channels, 
to provide strengthened and adequately resourced assistance to respond to these needs. 
 
25. In the period until the Fifth Session, further work in the Working Group on the Interaction 
between Trade and Competition Policy will focus on the clarification of: core principles, 
including transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness, and provisions on 
hardcore cartels; modalities for voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive 
reinforcement of competition institutions in developing countries through capacity building. 
Full account shall be taken of the needs of developing and least-developed country 
participants and appropriate flexibility provided to address them.” (WTO 2001) 12   
 
However there have been major differences in the way both the developed and 
developing countries look at the developmental gains from a multilateral framework on 
competition policy. The developed countries are mostly concerned with the market access 
issues as they have got investment interests in the developing countries which do not yet 
have effective competition policy that can protect foreign companies from 
anticompetitive practices by the local firms. Therefore, a multilateral agreement on 
competition policy would guarantee the foreign investors fair competition in the domestic 
market. The developing countries on the on the other hand are more concerned about 
restrictive business practices of the foreign multinationals. These countries have very 
little outward investment and hence are too less concerned with market access issues.
8 So 
the developing countries are interested in a multilateral rule that would ban cross border 
restrictive business practices that harm their economies. Therefore the key focus of the 
work of the WTO Working Group has been on the scope and benefits of the new 
approaches to cooperation in competition law enforcement at the multilateral level. 
 
3.2: Clarification of Issues (Doha Declaration) 
 
The Working Group report, 2002 analyses the four issues of the Doha Ministerial 
Declaration.   
3.2.1: Core Principles 
The core principles of WTO include rules on transparency, non-discrimination and 
procedural fairness. According to the Working Group discussion, these principles are 
central to the credibility and effectiveness of competition policy. The inclusion of these 
principles in a WTO agreement on competition policy would establish a competition 
culture and assure traders and investors of a level playing field in competition there by 
contributing to enhanced trade and competition flows.  
 
Looking further into the role and application of each of these principles, the report 
suggested that in the field of competition policy a transparency commitment would 
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refer to laws, regulations and guidelines of general applications as well as to sectoral 
exclusions and exemptions. The members would have to ensure the publication of such 
laws, regulations and guidelines in a comprehensive and timely manner and these 
documents should be made available to the public either in an official gazette or journal 
or in electronic form on a website. Also a commitment to transparency requires 
mandatory notification of these elements to the WTO.  
The principle of non-discrimination refers to two components such as: most favoured 
nation (MFN) treatment and national treatment. The members agreed on the view that no 
competition law discriminates between companies of different nationalities on a de jure 
basis. Issues could arise with regard to the status of bilateral and regional trade 
agreements in competition policy. The view at WGTCP was that bilateral and regional 
agreements should be allowed to continue and the provision on non-discrimination 
should apply only to de jure discrimination i.e. to discrimination embodies in laws 
regulations and guidelines of general application and not to de facto instances of 
discrimination. 
The principle of procedural fairness ensures that parties facing adverse decisions and 
sanctions are given adequate basic rights to defend their cases. The relevant rights are (a) 
firms be notified that a formal investigation is pending against them; (b) firms should 
have the opportunity to submit evidence and documents; and present their views to the 
authorities concerned either in writing or by participating in public hearings; (c) appeal 
before an independent judicial body; and (d) protection of confidential information 
submitted to the authorities. 
In addition to these three main core principles, two more principles: special and 
differential treatment and comprehensiveness were proposed and discussed at the 
Working Group meeting. Special and differential treatment provides more favourable 
treatment to developing countries in meeting their WTO obligations. Possible dimensions 
of this principle include preferential market access, flexibility of commitments, 
safeguarding their development interests and granting transitional periods in complying 
with WTO obligations. Comprehensiveness is one of the four principles used in the 14   
APEC
9 to enhance competition and regulatory reform. It advocates that exemptions and 
exclusions should be designed in such a way that they minimize distortion of the 
competition process and they would be subject to periodic re-examination within the 
context of an overall competition framework. 
3.2.2: National Submissions to Working Group on Core Principles 
A number of questions and concerns were raised through country submissions on the 
proposal to incorporate core principles in a multilateral framework. Many members like 
the USA raised concerns that disclosure requirements in transparency obligations may 
not be workable given the different legal, political and institutional environments of 
members. There were also worries that the disclosure clauses will impose heavy 
compliance costs particularly on developing countries. The submissions made by India, 
China and Thailand stress upon flexibility in the implementation of transparency 
provisions. Notwithstanding these observations submissions made by some countries like 
the European Community, Australia, Switzerland and Canada broadly supports the 
transparency provisions. These countries also suggest that ‘developing countries be given 
sufficient time and flexibility to progressively build transparency in the administration 
and enforcement of the competition law’
10.  
 
Non-discrimination probably is probably the most controversial principle to be discussed 
at WTGCP. Few country submissions like one made by Korea strongly supports the non-
discrimination principle. Korea’s submission states that “…in principle there should be 
no problem applying national Treatment and most favoured Nation treatment in a 
straightforward way to competition policy” (Korea WT/WGTCP/W/212 2002). However 
submissions from countries like Thailand and India questioned the appropriateness of 
disciplines on non discrimination for developing countries as evidenced from the 
following Thai submission: “…developing countries should be allowed to exempt 
national and international export cartels. This is because most developing countries 
exporters or importers are mainly small scale and may need to bind together to counter 
the bargaining power of larger buyers or sellers from industrialized countries...”(Thailand 
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WT/WGTCP/W/213 2002). According to India’s submission a competition policy which 
equally applies to all members will discriminate against firms in developing countries. 
 
With regard to the principle of procedural fairness, there was no broad consensus on the 
meaning of procedural fairness in the context of competition law enforcement. There 
were concerns regarding the implications of the principle of procedural fairness to 
developing countries as it may require a Member to set up and maintain a judicial 
framework for handling appeal cases. Therefore submissions from Thailand, China and 
Hong Kong argued that each and every Member of the WTO should be allowed to design 
establish and maintain the procedural system that is suitable to national conditions and 
consistent with its level of development. 
 
3.2.3: Hard Core Cartels 
Hard core cartels refer to collusive practices through price or quantity fixing and market 
allocation. A World Bank study by Levenstein and Suslow (2001) indicated that 
international hard core cartels had a substantial detrimental impact on developing 
countries. The study found that cartel affected imports comprise of 6.7 percent of all 
developing countries imports in 1997, worth US$81.1 billion in goods and services. The 
price mark up attributable to the cartels was as high as 45 to 50 percent implying the 
immense cost of imports of the developing countries. The WGTCP recognised that hard 
core cartels undermined the potential benefits of trade liberalisation and inflicted heavy 
losses particularly on developing countries. The report suggested that cartels tend to 
operate in countries with weak or non-existent enforcement of competition laws. The 
European Union proposed that a multilateral framework on competition policy should 
include (a) the introduction of national competition law in every member country with a 
provision prohibiting hard core cartels; and (b) a cooperative framework that would 
promote the exchange of information on cartels between WTO members. 
 
3.2.4: National Submissions on Hard Core cartel 
A number of submissions  (eg. Thailand, Korea) to the Working Group noted the harmful 
impact of international cartels particularly to developing countries. However numerous 16   
questions were raised on the definition and scope of hard core cartels. Also for many 
developing countries obligation to introduce competition law and put in place the related 
enforcement institutions could be very costly and burdensome. Moreover India argued for 
a ban on exemptions from national competition laws for export cartels. Thailand 
suggested that due to financial constraints in the developing countries  “ competition 
agencies in the developing economies be financially compensated for delivering 
requested services and be allowed to cooperate to the extent possible subject to technical 
and financial constraints” (Thailand WT/WGTCP/W/205 2002). At the WGTCP the 
members were of the view that the Working Group should further discuss issues such as 
definition, exemptions and additional features such as reference to penalties in the 
provisions on hard core cartels in a multi lateral framework on competition policy. 
 
3.2.5: Modalities for Voluntary Cooperation 
With regard to the need for multilateral cooperation in competition policy the Working 
Group expressed that with the globalisation of business activities, anticompetitive 
business practices occurred globally. Under such circumstances, it is difficult for a single 
country to correctly assess the effects of these practices and effectively prevent them. In 
the Working Group meeting two principal types of cooperation were analysed in a 
possible WTO framework on competition policy. The first one refers to the general 
exchange of experiences, views, knowledge etc among competition authorities; where as 
the other one refers to case specific cooperation. These modalities of cooperation would 
be non-binding in nature and would not be limited to the investigation of hard core 
cartels. These mechanisms could be used all cases of anti competitive practices including 
abuse of dominant position, vertical restraints and other practices.  
 
3.2.6: National Submissions on Modalities for Voluntary Cooperation 
The submissions of WTO members with regard to voluntary cooperation are generally 
supportive of a multilateral framework in this area. The European Commission, Canada 
and Korea advocated for the establishment on a WTO competition policy committee 
structured in a way to monitor all notifications and transactions between separate member 
states. The EC’s detailed outline of the functions of the committee: experience exchange, 17   
peer reviews and periodic reports on competition developments. Australia suggested a 
more formal system particularly in regard to the transfer of confidential information 
between nations. However Hong Kong and China pointed towards more information on 
this requirement before agreeing to any commitment.  
 
3.2.7: Capacity Building and Technical Assistance 
Capacity building and technical assistance generally refers to the assistance provided by 
industrialized countries in the creation and strengthening of competition policy 
infrastructure in developing countries. The WGTCP report suggested that WTO members 
agreed on the usefulness of capacity building and technical assistance to developing 
countries. Also they agreed upon long term assistance which should be tailored to the 
specific needs of member countries. 
 
3.2.8: National Submissions on Capacity Building and Technical Assistance 
The national submissions are supportive of capacity building and technical assistance. 
According to the submission made by the European Commission “the WTO can make as 
important contribution towards the development of a reinforced and better coordinated 
approach to technical assistance in the competition field” (EC WT/WGTCP/W/184 
2002). The US suggested that technical assistance programmes must take into account the 
county and culture, local concerns and conditions, and the body of domestic law. 
 
The work of the WGTCP helped to clarify many competition related issues and identify a 
number of areas in which there might be the scope for agreement. The WGTCP has 
discussed extensively the ‘relevance of fundamental WTO principles of national 
treatment, transparency and most favoured nation treatment to competition policy and 
vice versa’
11. The WGTCP focused on some modest provisions to be included at the 
WTO. The proposals didn’t aim at extensive harmonisation of national competition 
laws/policies rather focused on greater cooperation and introduction of best practices in 
competition policy. However, irrespective of the wide ranging examination of the 
relationship between these two issues by the WTO working group, no agreement could be 
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reached on this issue at the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, 2003 and hence 
discussions on competition policy  have not taken place in the Doha Round. These 
proposals were resisted on the ground that national competition policies among the 
developed economies are diverse and many developing country members of the WTO do 
not have competition policy at all. The Developing countries also argued that introducing 
national competition policies will not be in their interest as it will restrict them in 
pursuing own industrial and development strategies. In addition, developing countries 
also argued that introduction of competition policies in  WTO negotiations would imply 
expanding the agenda for developing countries which already had problems of 
implementing what was already on the agenda after 2001. 
 
3.3: Competition Provisions in the existing WTO agreements. 
Though no consensus could be reached on a competition policy framework in the WTO, 
there are number of provisions under GATT 1994 and other WTO agreements such as 
TRIPs and GATS could be classified as competition related provisions and they do have 
possible application in cases of anticompetitive practices affecting trade and market 
access. Article II of the GATT requires that if a monopoly is retained by a WTO member 
such a monopoly shall not ‘operate so as to afford protection in excess of that provided 
for in schedules’. Article III (national Treatment) refers to equal treatment between 
domestic and national firms. However in GATS national treatment is not a general 
obligation rather it is tied to specific market access commitments that must be negotiated 
by the service sector. But the national treatment definition as proposed by European 
Union in the WGTCP is different from GATT and GATS. The EC proposal refers to the 
nationality of firms rather than that of products which implies that the principle of non-
discrimination applies more to foreign investment than foreign trade. Also the discussion 
at WGTCP suggested that non-discrimination clause would be applied only on a de jure 
basis, i.e. discrimination embodied in the laws, regulations and guidelines of general 
application. 
 
Similarly Article XI (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions) of GATT 
prohibits members from imposing quantitative restrictions other than duties and taxes on 19   
import/export of products across border. However as stated by Article XVII (State 
Trading Enterprises) the focus of GATT anticompetitive provisions are on government 
actions, the application of non commercial criteria by state owned companies or 
companies that benefit from exclusive or special rights granted by government. Article 
XXIII of GATT provides the option of using existing GATT rules to address 
anticompetitive practices when a WTO member feels that the benefits achieved under this 
agreement is nullifies by measures not violating any part of GATT. For example Article 
XXII on consultation of GATT can be used when the benefits of market access for a 
WTO member are nullified by the absence of competition in a target market.  
 
The GATS agreement while dealing with regulatory issues, touches upon many issues on 
competition. According to Article II of the GATS, monopolies should not abuse the 
market power when competing in services outside their monopoly rights. The sector 
agreements in the GATS also include many elements of competition policy. The 
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services requires monopoly rights to be 
listed and efforts should be made towards reducing them. The Reference Paper on Basic 
Telecommunications negotiated in 1997 prohibits cross subsidization. 
 
The TRIPs agreement also contains elements of competition policy. Article 8 of TRIPs 
suggests that WTO members may take appropriate measures to prevent abuse of 
intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant 
market. Article 40 allows competition authorities of the WTO members to control certain 
licensing agreements in case of an abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse 
effect on competition in the relevant market.  
 
Though these agreements contain a fair number of elements of competition law, most of 
the provisions are weak and members have seldom made use of these provisions. Also 
these provisions are limited in scope as they only target measures taken by the State and 
State owned business entities; but not by private business entities. This implies that 
private anti-competitive practices like cartels are not within the sphere of these rules. 
Also these provisions do not require the domestic rules and regulations to be in place to 20   
protect or assure competition in the market. Owing to these limitations in the existing 
WTO rules, there were proposals for the inclusion of competition policy in the WTO 
framework. 
 
IV: Competition Provisions in Trade Agreements 
1. Rationale 
 
The difficulties of concluding effective multilateral agreements on competition law 
enforcement have been recognised despite many attempts to keep the issue alive. Even 
the regional agreements except the European Agreement (has an effective harmonised 
competition policy regime) on competition law and policy are severely constrained in the 
scope and content by national sovereignty considerations (Spier, 1997).  In order to 
improve cooperation in competition law and policy, countries have increasingly been 
establishing bilateral arrangements between competition agencies. There has also been 
another development of including competition provisions in a separate chapter in the 
bilateral and regional trade agreements. 
 
There has been a significant increase in the number of trade agreements (regional & 
bilateral) since mid 1990s with almost all countries forming a part of one or more trade 
agreement. A survey of these trade agreements indicates that they are quite varied in 
nature. Agreements have been taking place between economically and geographically 
diverse members. This recent wave of economic integration also looks beyond the 
traditional trade measures such as tariff and non tariff border measures. The new age 
agreements look at across the border measures such as liberalisation of services, 
investments and government procurements, strengthening  of technological and scientific 
cooperation, environment and competition related provisions. These provisions are found 
not only in agreements signed by developed countries but also in those between 
developed and developing countries. Some of the early agreements of this new 
regionalism were NAFTA and MERCOSUR.  
 
In recent times the competition related provisions in trade agreements have become very 
important. According to Evenett (2003) due to the increasing incidents of international 21   
mergers, existence of international cartels and their potentially negative impact on 
developing countries, all the countries should be equipped with tools needed to deal with 
the increased market power of the multinational companies and their anticompetitive 
practices. This suggests that though the government imposed trade barriers have 
gradually been getting removed, there is every chance trade related private 
anticompetitive practices will emerge to erode the benefits of trade. Cernat (2005) 
explains that since national competition polices are not equipped to deal with the cross 
border anti competitive practices and in the absence of a binding multilateral framework 
on competition policy, regional competition policies become very important. As a result 
of these developments, the number of trade agreements with competition related 
provisions has increased significantly in the last two decades. In addition some 
cooperation agreements have also been signed by the competition authorities (US-Brazil). 
According to WTO (2003) estimates there are now 141 trade agreements containing 
competition related provisions.  
  
2. Overview of Competition Provisions in Trade Agreements 
 
Countries have been willing to include competition provisions in trade agreements with 
different levels of ambition and among countries at various levels of development. 
Agreements in the beginning followed the pattern of OECD recommendations providing 
for notification, exchange of information coordination and consultation
12. In recent times 
however, a greater cooperative approach has been taken in the drafting of bilateral 
competition cooperation agreement. Also it has been found that competition provisions 
vary with agreements from simple adoption of national competition laws to cooperation 
on positive comity and even dispute settlement. Some trade agreements contain general 
obligations to take action against anti competitive business conduct such as an obligation 
to adopt a domestic competition law without setting out specific provisions where as 
others call for more extensive coordination of specific competition standards and rules 
potentially requiring common competition laws and procedures.  Therefore, many 
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attempts have been made to prepare taxonomy of competition provisions in trade 
agreements.  
 
Bellis (1997) reviewed a number of bilateral and plurilateral RTAs to examine their 
competition provisions. Similarly Hoekman (1998) analysed the competition provisions 
in a number of plurilateral RTAs and their relationship with anti dumping measures. A 
recent study by OECD (2005) analysed the competition provisions of 86 regional trade 
agreements. The study categorized the competition provisions and examined which 
agreement includes what kind of provisions. Cernat (2005) also provided some insight 
into the suitability and availability of various competition provisions in trade agreements.  
Though the number and kind of competition provision vary with agreements, according 
to these studies competition provisions in trade agreements can be categorized as follows. 
2.1. Adoption and Enforcement  
 
This is an important feature of the competition provisions in trade agreements. The 
specifications requiring the adoption and application vary among the agreements. Some 
agreements broadly mention that parties will adopt measures to prohibit anti competitive 
behaviour while other agreements require specific actions by parties regarding such as 
creating competition agencies as was in the case of US-Singapore. The agreement 
stipulated that Singapore should enact competition legislation by January 2005. Existence 
of a national competition law is very important for the inclusion of competition 
provisions in trade agreements. Otherwise there is no legal basis for a Party to take any 
action against the anticompetitive practices taking place in the Partner state whose effects 
are felt in its own territory.  
2.2. Coordination and Cooperation  
 
Another important element of competition provisions is the clause related to cooperation 
in competition issues. The Parties recognize the importance of cooperation regarding 
issues such as notification of anti competitive practices, consultation and exchange of 
information required towards enforcement activities. Agreements like Japan-Mexico and 23   
Chile-Korea have established detailed cooperation mechanisms for each of these 
agreements.  
2.3. Anti Competitive Behaviour 
 
Though all the trade agreements having competition provisions generally refer to anti 
competitive practices, there are varying degrees of content and scope in these provisions. 
Some trade agreements have very broad and non binding language and don’t define the 
kinds of practices to be considered anti competitive eg. Japan – Mexico. On the other 
hand there are trade agreements like CARICOM that directs the parties to prohibit very 




While all the trade agreements have general non-discrimination clauses, only a few have 
competition specific non discrimination provisions. This provision requires the Parties to 
apply their competition laws and policies in a non-discriminatory manner.   
2.5. Due Process and Transparency 
 
Transparency and due process are essential facilitating measures in most trade 
agreements. The terms of these provisions parallel quite closely corresponding WTO 
provisions, such as GATT Article X, to which several trade agreements refer explicitly. 
GATT 1994 Article X requires Members to publish promptly all laws, regulations, 
judicial decisions and administrative rulings affecting imports and exports, and all 
bilateral agreements affecting international trade policy, so as to enable traders to become 
acquainted with them. Such laws, regulations, and rulings should be administered in a 
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner. 
 
Trade agreements also promote transparency through the collection and dissemination of 
all relevant information through centralized inquiry points, publications and display on-
line. However very few agreements include due process provisions which address the 
rights to fair and equitable judicial processes, to be notified of the proceedings, etc. The 
clauses related to transparency in competition related issues are very specific in nature 24   
and hence limited in their scope of application. According to OECD (2005) study, this 
only applies to regulations addressing state aid. In several trade agreements they are not 
stated explicitly but only implied as objectives to be achieved through the implementation 




The link between anti-dumping and competition policy continues to be considered in the 
negotiation of new trade agreements and is an area where regional approaches may differ 
considerably from what is currently contemplated multilaterally and under the disciplines 
of the WTO. Anti-dumping duties were traditionally seen as a way of addressing the risk 
for the cases of monopolists in one country using their domestic market power to enable 
predatory pricing that is cutting prices in another market to drive local firms out of 
business and thus extending the dominant firm’s monopoly. In some trade agreements the 
parties have agreed to abolish the use of anti dumping measures between members of the 
agreement (eg. Canada-Chile).  
 
2.7. Dispute Settlement 
 
Majority of trade agreements exclude competition related provisions from the purview of 
formal dispute settlement mechanisms. However many EU agreements allow for dispute 
settlements and partial dispute settlement mechanism is also provided in the US –
Singapore free trade agreements.  
 
2.8. Special and Differential Treatment (S&D) 
 
This provision is generally extended to the developing and least developing countries. In 
the context of S&D treatment, the provisions like technical assistance, capacity building, 
and transition periods are especially very relevant elements of competition policy. These 
types of S&D treatment appeared in many trade agreements with different frequencies. 25   
Some agreements use the form of flexibility commitments which includes non reciprocal 
provisions in general and especially exemptions and exceptions.  
 
The above analysis suggests the possible types of competition provisions in trade 
agreements. However, it should be clear that all the provisions are not present in each 
agreement. The competition provisions vary from agreement to agreement. 
V. Case Studies: Competition Provisions in Free Trade Agreements 
 
There has been a proliferation of bilateral agreements having competition related 
provisions. Therefore observing the potential effects of some of the bilateral agreements 
may provide some insights into the economic advantages of such agreement, giving 
policy makers some useful guidance. In this context, few trade agreements (EU-Mexico, 
Japan-Singapore, US-Singapore, Australia-New Zealand, NAFTA, and US-Korea) were 
selected for detailed analysis. While analysing the case studies, we look at the contents of 
the chapter, effectiveness of the chapter and the scope of the chapter.   
1.  EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement 
1.1. Rationale 
 
The agreement came into force on 1
st July, 2000 and happens to be the first agreement to 
be negotiated between a Latin American country and the 15 member states of EU. This 
FTA offered the EU and its member states a preferential opening into the growing market 
of NAFTA which was not possible in the absence of free trade agreements with US or 
Canada. Similarly for Mexico the agreement opened up an expansive market of almost 
500 million European consumers. The agreement covered many aspects of trade such as 
trade in goods; market access; government procurement; intellectual property rights; 
cooperation and competition policy. The FTA was aimed at achieving the long term goals 
of greater dynamism in commercial and economic activity, creation of employment, 
fostering of investment and increasing opportunities and possibilities for strategic 
alliances
13.  
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However, both parties recognized that the benefits of free trade may be distorted by 
private anti competitive behaviour. In order to ensure that the advantages of the free trade 
regime are not undermined by private barriers to trade such as through anti competitive 
business conduct, both the parties agreed to include provisions on competition policy and 
cooperation and coordination thereof in the trade agreement
14. The more specific 
competition provisions of this agreement are presented in Annex XV to the agreement. In 
essence the objectives of the mechanism are as thus: 
(a)   to  promote  cooperation and coordination between the parties regarding the 
application of their competition laws in their respective territories and to 
provide mutual assistance in any fields of competition policy they consider 
necessary; 
(b)   to eliminate anti competitive activities  by applying the appropriate legislation, 
in order to avoid adverse effects on trade and economic development, as well as 
the possible negative impact that such activities may have on the other Party’s 
interests; and 
(c) to  promote cooperation in order to clarify any differences in the application of 
their respective competitive laws.
15 
 
There has been no other agency to agency agreement between the competition authorities 
of the EU and Mexico though they are the principal enforcement agencies responsible for 
the operation of the competition sections of the FTA. Therefore, the provisions contained 
in the FTA must act as the principal guide for these agencies in the coordination of their 
competition law enforcement activities. 
 
1.2. Main Competition Provisions (Cooperation and Coordination) 
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Chapter II of the Annex XV contains provisions related to cooperation and coordination 
as they apply to competition policy. The main provisions relating to this aspect of 
competition policy are analysed below.  
 
a Notification 
Article 3 of the Annex XV provides provisions relating to the process of notification. It 
suggests that each competition authority shall notify the competition authority of the 
other Party of an enforcement activity if: 
(a)  it is relevant to enforcement activities of the other Party; 
(b)  it may affect the other Party's important interests; 
(c)  it relates to restrictions on competition which may affect the territory of the 
other Party 
(d)  decisions may be adopted conditioning or prohibiting action in the territory of 
the other Party 
 
According to this Article, notification should take place during the initial phase of 
investigation to enable the notified competition authority to express its opinion. However 
this requirement is applicable only if this is not contrary to the parties competition laws 
and does not adversely affect the investigation. The opinions received may be taken into 
consideration when taking decisions. It also require the notification to be detailed enough 
to permit an evaluation by the other party and shall include 
(a)  a description of the restrictive effects of the transaction on competition and the 
applicable legal basis; 
(b)  the relevant market for the product or service and its geographical scope, the 
characteristics of the economic sector concerned and data on the economic 
agents involved in the transaction; and 
(c)  the estimated deadlines for resolution, in cases in which the procedure has been 
initiated, and to the extent possible an indication of its probable out-come, and 
of the measures which may be taken or provided for. 
 
  The Parties are also required to notify each other of any measures other than 
enforcement activities that could affect the other party’s interest.  The particular cases 
provided are as such 
(a)  administrative or judicial proceedings; and 
(b)  measures taken by other governmental agencies, including current or future 
regulatory bodies, which may have an impact to enhance competition in specific 
regulated sectors 
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b. Exchange of Information 
Article 4 deals with the provision of exchange of information and specifies the following 
types of information to be exchanged by the competition authorities: 
(a)  to the extent practicable, texts on legal theory,  case-law  or  market  studies         
in the public domain, or in the absence of such documents, non-confidential 
data or summaries; 
(b)  information related to the application of competition legislation provided that it 
does not adversely affect the person providing such information, and for the sole 
purpose of helping to resolve the procedure; and 
(c)  information concerning any known anticompetitive activities and any 
innovations introduced into the respective legal systems in order to improve the 
application of their respective competition laws. 
 
Further the Article says, if circumstances require, then the competition authorities should 
help each other to collect data in their respective territories. However such information 
collection should not involve violation of either party’s national laws. It also aims at 
promoting knowledge and understanding of each other’s competition law and policy and 
state that the evaluation of cooperation mechanism is also to be achieved through both 
formal and informal meetings of representatives of each party. 
 
c. Coordination of Enforcement Activities 
Article 5 allows the competition authorities to coordinate their enforcement activities 
with specific cases and does not prevent either party from taking independent decisions. 
In determining the extent of coordination the Parties should consider 
(a)  the effective results which coordination could produce; 
(b)  the additional information to be obtained; 
(c)  the reduction in costs for the competition authorities and the economic agents 
involved; and 
(d)  the applicable deadlines under their respective legislation 
 
d. Consultations 
Article 6 of the Annex XV provides for the use of consultation when important interests 
of one Party are adversely affected in the territory of the other Party. It allows the 
competition authority of one Party to transmit its views or request for consultation if it 
considers the proceedings and investigations being conducted by the competition 
authority of the other party may affect its interests. The competition authority so 
addressed should give full and systematic consideration to the views expressed by the 29   
requesting competition authority i.e. application of negative comity. Also allows 
consultation in case of anticompetitive activity in the territory of the other party. 
 
e. Avoidance of Conflicts 
To avoid conflicts Article 7 states that each Party should wherever possible take 
important interests of the other Party into consideration when taking enforcement actions 
under its competition law. Also the Parties shall seek a mutually acceptable solution by 
considering 
 
(a)  the importance of the measure and the impact which it has on the interests of 
one Party, by comparing the benefits to be obtained by the other Party; 
(b)  the presence or absence, in the actions of the economic agents concerned, of the 
intention to affect consumers, suppliers or competitors; 
(c)  the degree of any inconsistencies between the legislation of one Party and the 
measures to be applied by the other Party; 
(d)  whether the economic agents involved will be subject to incompatible requests 
by both Parties; 
(e)  the initiation of the procedure or the imposition of penalties or remedies; 
(f)  the location of the assets of the economic agents involved; and 
(g)  the importance of the penalty to be imposed in the territory of the other Party. 
 
f. Confidentiality 
Article 8 of the Annex XV suggests that any information exchanged under the agreement 
is subject to the confidentiality laws of both Parties. Any confidential information whose 
dissemination is expressly prohibited or whose dissemination could adversely affect the 
Parties, shall not be provided without the express consent of the source of the 
information. The competition authorities are to maintain the confidentiality of the 
information received and should oppose any disclosure of such information by a third 
party that is not authorized by the competition authority that supplied the information.   
 
g. Technical Cooperation 
According to Article 9 of the Annex, the Parties agree to provide each other the technical 
assistance so that they can both take advantage of their respective experience and 
strengthen the implementation of their competition laws and policies. Technical 
assistance will include; training of officials of both Parties, seminars in particular for civil 
servants, the administration of joint studies on competition laws and policies and 
utilisation of developments in communication and computer systems. 30   
 
1.3. Scope of the Agreement on Competition Provisions 
 
The competition provisions of Chapter II given in Annex XV of the EU-Mexico FTA 
apply to anticompetitive activities as defined under the competition laws of a Party and 
which is subject to penalties and remedies. As per the respective competition laws these 
provisions then apply to anti competitive activities including restrictive agreements and 
concerted practices, abuse of a dominant position and mergers, acquisitions and full-
function joint ventures which will ‘significantly impede effective competition in the 
common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position’ in the EU. The law also prohibits certain types of 
aid to companies by member states such as state aid which ‘distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods’. The 
competition law of Mexico prohibits monopolistic practices that tend to diminish, harm, 
or impede competition and the freedom to produce, process, distribute or market goods 
and services. The practices include essentially horizontal agreements with the object or 
effect of price fixing, output restriction, market division or bid rigging. Even the vertical 
agreements like tied sales are also prohibited.  
 
Further dealing with the scope the agreement states that the enforcement activities should 
be notified if it is relevant to the enforcement activities of the other Party. Again the 
notification clause can be used if the enforcement activities relate to restrictive practices 
affecting the territory of the other Party. The requirement also arises if there is need to 
prohibit actions in the territory of the other Party and involve the search for information 
located in the territory of the other Party. However the confidentiality clause and the lack 
of legally binding provisions, provide discretionary power to the contracting Parties to 
overlook the agreement if they consider their interests are adversely affected by following 
the provisions in the agreement (Papadopoulos, 2005). 
 
The EU-Mexico FTA allows both parties to use WTO provisions for anti-dumping. 
During 1995-2004 Mexico brought three anti dumping actions against the EU and the EU 
brought one against Mexico (Holmes et al. 2005). This agreement also contains elaborate 31   
provisions on dispute settlement that appear to cover competition. The clause on dispute 
settlement says that “Dispute settlement mechanism: binds for the parties and covers all 
aspects of the agreement”.
16 However the study by Marsden and Whelan (2005) suggest 
that the chances of sanction under the EU-Mexico FTA settlement for alleged violation of 
Annex XV is very remote and as a matter of interpretation, the dispute settlement 
procedures in question don’t apply to Annex XV.  
 
Another important issue related to competition provisions in trade agreements is whether 
it involves substantive rule changes or only facilitates cooperation within the existing 
procedures. The EU-Mexico FTA does not have any provision requiring any change in 
the partner’s law which implies that there is no requirement towards harmonisation of 
competition policies. In particular Mexico (developing country) is not required to align or 
create own rules that are identical to the agreements provisions as that is one possible 
outcome of a bilateral trade between developed and developing countries. The chapter 
also does not have provisions regarding exemption of sectors from the purview of 
competition provisions. 
 
1.4. Effectiveness of the Provisions 
 
Azevedo (2005) suggests that the effectiveness of the competition provisions in an 
agreement depends on the channels to establish and exchange of information between 
competition authorities at various phases of investigation. In case of a developing 
country’s involvement, the most important competition provision has been that of 
technical cooperation and capacity building. As mentioned above the EU-Mexico FTA 
includes provisions for technical assistance as detailed under Article 9 of the Annex XV. 
However, many authors have suggested that the confidentiality clause on information 
exchange is the major limitation to the effectiveness of the agreement.  
 
However, in reality there is very little information available on the enforcement of the 
competition provisions. The use of competition provisions by Parties is generally not 
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published (Cernat, 2005). In such a situation Marsden and Whelan (2005) provides some 
information about the EU-Mexico information activities. According to their study, the 
Mexicans have notified the EU of their enforcement activity on 31 occasions and they 
have only been notified of EU enforcement activity only on 1 occasion. In the case of 
request for consultation, 2 have been made by EU and 12 by Mexico. This statistics lead 
Marsden and Whelan (2005) to suggest that ‘It is unclear what conclusions can be drawn 
from these statistics, apart from the fact that the parties have been cooperating in a 
manner advocated by the cooperation mechanism i.e. through consultation and 
notifications’.  
 
2. US-Singapore Free Trade Agreement 
2.1. Rationale 
The US-Singapore FTA was signed on May 6, 2003 at Washington and came into force 
since January 1, 2004. This agreement is the United State’s first FTA with an Asian 
nation. The U.S.-Singapore FTA covered aspects such as market access in goods, 
services, investment, government procurement, intellectual property, and provides for 
groundbreaking cooperation in promoting labor rights and the environment. In order to 
ensure that that anticompetitive business practices do not restrict the bilateral trade and 
investment, both Parties agreed to include competition provisions relating to prohibition, 
implementation and cooperation clauses as a separate chapter in the trade agreement
17. 
The specific competition provisions of this agreement are presented in Chapter 12 of this 
agreement. 
 
2.2. Main Competition Provisions 
 
Chapter 12 of the FTA contains very detailed but specific competition provisions relating 
to anticompetitive business conduct, monopolies and cooperation.  
 
a. Anticompetitive Business Conduct 
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Article 12.2 of Chapter 12 provides provisions for prohibiting anticompetitive business 
practices. It says 
(a)  Each Party shall adopt or maintain measures to limit anti competitive business 
conduct in their jurisdiction and each establish or maintain an authority within 
their countries to enforce such measures
18; 
(b)  The objective is to promote economic efficiency and consumer welfare; 
(c)  The enforcement policy directs the national authorities not to discriminate on 
the basis of the nationality of the subjects. Any person penalized for violation of 
such measures can seek review of the sanction in a domestic court or 
independent tribunal 
 
b. Designated Monopolies and Government Enterprises 
Article 12.3 specifies the provisions on designated monopolies and government 
enterprises. 
1. Designated Monopolies 
(a)  Does not prevent a Party from designating a monopoly 
(b)  The Party which designates a monopoly and if the designation affects the 
interest of the other Party then the Party should introduce such conditions on the 
operation of the monopoly so as not to nullify or minimize the benefits of trade 
arising under chapter 2 (National Treatment and Market Access for Goods), 3 
(Rules of Origin), 8 (Cross Border Trade in Services) and 16 (Intellectual 
Property Rights). 
(c)  The Party shall provide written notification in advance wherever possible to the 
other Party of the designation and such conditions 
(d)  Each Party shall ensure that  
¾  the designated monopoly acts in a manner that is not inconsistent with the 
Party’s obligations under this agreement 
¾  Acts solely in accordance with commercial considerations in its purchase 
or sale of the monopoly of good or service in the relevant market 
¾  Does not engage in anti competitive practices in a non monopolized 
market in its territory that adversely affect covered investments 
 
2. Government Enterprises 
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(a)   Nothing in this agreement prevents a Party from establishing or maintaining a 
 government enterprise 
(b)   Each Party shall ensure that the government enterprise acts in a manner that is 
 not inconsistent with the Party’s obligations under this agreement 
(c)   The US shall ensure that its government enterprise accords non-discriminatory 
 treatment in the sale of its good and services to covered investments. 
(d)   In addition Singapore shall ensure that any government enterprise 
¾  acts solely on the basis of commercial considerations in the purchase and sale 
of goods or services 
¾  provides non-discriminatory treatment to covered investments, to goods of the 
United States and to service suppliers of the United States including with 
respect to its purchase or sales
19,  
¾  does not either directly or indirectly enter into agreements among competitors 
that restrain competition on price or output or allocate customers without any 
plausible efficiency justification. 
¾  Does not engage in exclusionary practices that reduces competition in a 
market in Singapore to the detriment of consumers 
(e)   Singapore shall not take any action directly or indirectly to influence or direct 
 decisions of its government enterprises. However it may exercise its voting 
 rights in government enterprises in a manner which is not inconsistent with the 
 Agreement 
(f)   Singapore to have goal to eventually eliminate aggregate ownership and other 
 interests that confer effective influence in entities organised under laws of 
 Singapore 
(g)   Singapore also commits to a detailed consolidated annual report for such entities 
 identifying the percentage of shares owned by the government, a description of 
 special shares or voting rights, the name and title of any government official 
 serving as an officer, and annual revenues and/or total assets 
 
3. Price Discrimination 
(a)    Price discriminations based on normal commercial considerations is not 
  inconsistent with this article 
 4. Government Procurement 
(a)  This article does not apply to government procurement 
 
c. Cooperation 
Article 12.4 suggests that the Parties agree to cooperate and coordinate in competition 
matters so as to make the competition law and policy further effective in the free trade 
area.  
 
d. Transparency and Information Requests 
Article 12.5 specifies the following provisions relating to transparency and information 
exchange: 
(a)  The Parties commit to the value of transparency of their competition policies 
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(b)  Parties commit to make publicly available information requested of each other 
  regarding enforcement measures prohibiting anti competitive business conduct 
(c)  Each Party at the request of the other Party shall make available public 
  information concerning government enterprises and designated monopolies, 
  both public and private.  
(d)  Each Party at the request of the other Party shall make available public 
  information concerning exemptions to measures proscribing anticompetitive 
 business  conduct 
 
e. Consultations 
Article 12.6 says that each Party at the request of the other Party enters into consultations 
regarding specific matters that arise under this chapter. The Party shall give full and 
sympathetic consideration to the concerns of the other party which implies the application 
of negative comity. In addition this clause requires Singapore to inform the United States 
in case of any anticompetitive conduct by its government enterprises of the steps it has 
taken or plans to take to examine the conduct at issue, about the enforcement proceedings 
and their results. 36   
f. Disputes 
Article 12.7 says that Parties don’t have recourse to dispute settlement mechanism under 
this agreement for any matter arising under Article 12.2, 12.4, or 12.6 i.e. anticompetitive 
business conducts, cooperation and consultations respectively. 
 
g. Definitions 
Article 12.8 defines few terms like covered entity, investment etc used in the agreement 
and thus affects the scope of the arrangement accordingly.  
2.3. Scope of the Agreement on Competition Provisions 
 
The competition clauses of Chapter 12 of the US-Singapore FTA apply to 
anticompetitive business conducts. However the anti competitive business conducts has 
not been defined in the agreement. The Parties are allowed to apply their own 
competition laws in their respective territories. Again no detailed list or elaboration of 
such measures is given. In this agreement the objective of prohibiting anti competitive 
practices has been to promote consumer welfare and economic efficiency rather relating 
it to trade. Both the parties agree to make the competition enforcement policy non-
discriminatory on the basis of nationality. 
 
A very detailed discussion on the establishment and conduct of the designated 
monopolies and government enterprises is done in this chapter. Though both the parties 
are to ensure that the designated monopolies and government enterprises act in a manner 
that is not inconsistent with the Party’s obligations under the agreement, Singapore in 
addition is required to undertake some more measures. For example, Singapore 
undertakes to act solely on the basis of commercial considerations in purchases and sales 
of goods and services involving government enterprises; not to enter into exclusionary or 
competition restraining practices with competitors, not to use voting rights to influence 
decisions of government enterprises in non commercial ways, and to have as a goal to 
eventually eliminate the aggregate ownership as confers effective influence over such 
entities. Singapore also commits to a detailed consolidated annual report for such entities 
identifying the percentage of shares owned by the government, a description of special 37   
shares or voting rights, the name and title of any government official serving as an 
officer, and annual revenues and/or assets. This may be due to the fact that Singapore 
didn’t have a national competition law at the time of signing this FTA. 
 
The scope of the article expands to the provisions of notification, consultation and 
exchange of information. The Parties are required to provide a written notification 
wherever possible of the designation of monopolies. The Parties at the request of each 
other make available public information concerning the enforcement measures, 
government enterprises, designated monopolies and exemptions to the measures 
prohibiting anticompetitive behaviour. The scope of the agreement is restricted as price 
discrimination as a business practice is not explicitly covered in this chapter.     
Government procurement also lies out of the purview of this chapter. This chapter allows 
for partial use of dispute settlement mechanism under this agreement. The legal nature of 
the competition provisions in the US - Singapore FTA indicates the presence of both soft 
and hard laws as some provisions like enacting general competition legislation by 
January 2005 were binding on the part of Singapore. However, though Singapore has 
enacted a national competition law, there are no provisions requiring harmonisation of 
competition provisions.  
 
Chapter 12 of the US-Singapore FTA is a very detailed one and deals with many aspects 
competition of law. The provisions are included so that they not only prohibit private 
anticompetitive practices, but also limit the anticompetitive conducts of the government 
enterprises. The agreement leaves both Parties free to use WTO provisions on 
antidumping.  
2.4. Effectiveness of the Competition Provisions 
 
The agreement being a very recent one, an empirical analysis of its effectiveness is very 
difficult. Since there is no empirical data available, we tried to get this information by 
interviewing the trade and competition authorities of Singapore. From our discussion 
with them, it was known that these provisions have never been implemented. There has 
been no such complain against anticompetitive practices by either Party and hence no 38   
enforcement measure has been taken till now. However, they are quite hopeful that in 
case of such a situation, there will be an increased level of cooperation and coordination 
given that these provisions are included in the agreement. 
 
3. Singapore-Japan New Age Economic Partnership 
3.1. Rationale 
 
This agreement came into force on 30
th November 2002. This FTA was supposed to 
facilitate and promote liberalisation as well as provide a stable environment for economic 
activity. It aimed at strengthening the economic relation between the Parties through 
cooperation. The FTA covered many aspects of trade such as trade in goods, services, 
investment, intellectual property rights, government procurement and competition. The 
Chapter 12 of the Singapore – Japan New Age Economic Partnership which deals with 
the competition provisions is very brief. This may be due to the reason that Singapore 
didn’t have the national competition law at the time of signing this agreement. The 
objective for including the competition provisions was to control anti competitive 
activities and promote cooperation in the field of anti competitive practices in order to 
facilitate trade and investment flows between the Parties and effective functioning of its 
markets
20.  
3.2. Main Competition Provisions 
 
Chapter 12 of this agreement specifies various competition related provisions and the 
details and procedures of the cooperation provisions are analysed in Chapter 5 of the 
implementing agreement.  The provisions are discussed below. 
 
a Anti-competitive Activities 
Article 103 of the Chapter 12 allows each Party to take appropriate measures in 
accordance to their applicable laws and regulations against anticompetitive activities. The 
Parties are also free to review and improve or adopt laws and regulations to effectively 
control anticompetitive activities whenever necessary.  
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b. Cooperation on Controlling Anti-competitive Activities 
Article 104 states that the Parties shall cooperate in controlling anticompetitive activities 
subject to their resource availability. The details of the procedures of cooperation are 
given in Chapter 5 of the Implementing Agreement. The purpose of this chapter is to 
implement the cooperation provisions mentioned in Article 104 of the basic agreement. 
 
c. Notification 
Article 17 of Chapter 5 deals with the notification process of the Parties. It states that  
 
(a)  Each Party shall notify the other Party with respect to its enforcement activities 
if the notifying Party considers that the enforcement activities affect its 
important interests. 
(b)  Notification should be detailed enough to enable the notified Party to make an 
initial evaluation of the impact 
(c)  Each Party should notify the other about any amendment in the competition law 
or any adoption of new law 
(d)  Each Party should provide copies of publicly released guidelines or policy 
statements issued in relation to competition laws of its country 
 
d. Exchange of Information 
Article 18 suggests that  
(a)  Each Party should inform the other Party regarding enforcement activities 
regarding anticompetitive practices that may have an adverse effect on the 
territory of the other Party 
(b)  Each Party should provide the other Party any significant information regarding 
anticompetitive activities that may warrant enforcement activities by the other 
party 
(c)  Each Party should also provide the other Party upon request information under 
its possession which is relevant to the enforcement activities of the other Party 
 
e. Technical Assistance 
Article 19 says that each Party may render technical assistance to the other Party for the 
effective management and adoption of laws and regulations for controlling 
anticompetitive activities. 
 
f. Terms and Conditions on Provisions of Information 
Article 20 clearly spells out the terms and condition for the use of information. It directs 
that 40   
(a) Information should be strictly used by the receiving Party for the purpose of 
effective enforcement of the competition laws of its country and not to be 
communicated to a third party 
(b) The information should be kept as confidential unless the provider Party consents 
to the disclosure of such information 
(c) A Party can limit the information it communicates if the other Party fails to give 
the assurance of confidentiality 
(d) A Party is not required to communicate any information if it is prohibited by the 
laws and regulations or incompatible with its important interests 
 
g. Use of Information in Criminal Proceedings 
Article 20 states that information shall not be used by the receiving party in criminal 
proceedings carried out by a court or judge. In case of need the Party shall submit a 
request for such information to the Party that communicated the information through the 
diplomatic channel or other channel established in accordance with the laws of the 
requested Party.  
 
h. Scope of Chapter 5 
The scope of chapter 5 given in Article 22 is restricted to the extent that Article 17 
(Notification) and Article 18 (Exchange of Information) shall only apply to the sectors of 
telecommunications, electricity and gas. However this scope was limited due to the fact 
that Singapore didn’t have the competition law and these sectors were regulated by 
sectoral regulators. Therefore this Article had the provision of expanding the scope of 
cooperation through consultation when the Parties adopt new laws and regulation for 
controlling anticompetitive practices. 
 
i. Review and further Cooperation 
Article 23 requires the Parties to review the cooperation agreements in three years after 
the entry came into force. Upon such review the Parties may consider extending the 
cooperation mechanism to  
•  Co-ordination of enforcement activities 
•  Positive comity and 
•  Comity 
 
It also says that any such extension shall be subject to the applicable national competition 
laws and regulations and available resources of the Parties. 
 41   
j. Consultations 




Article 25 suggests that though communications under Article 17 and 18 can be directly 
carried out between the implementing authorities notification under Article 17 however 
shall be confirmed in writing through the diplomatic channel 
3.3. Scope of the Agreement on Competition Provisions 
 
The competition provisions in Chapter 12 of the basic agreement and Chapter 5 of the 
implementing agreement apply to anticompetitive activities affecting trade and 
investment flows between Parties. However it fails to define the anticompetitive activities 
and hence this makes the enforcement very difficult. The scope of competition provisions 
relating to cooperation (notification and exchange of information) again becomes limited 
with the sectoral exemptions. These provisions only apply to the sectors of 
telecommunications, electricity and gas and all other sectors are exempted from their 
application.  
 
As has been seen in case of the EU-Mexico FTA and Singapore-US FTA, the 
competition provisions included in the Singapore-Japan New Age Economic Partnership 
are also non-binding in nature. There is no scope for positive or negative comity. The 
agreement does not have any provision requiring the necessity of formulating a national 
competition law by Singapore or making any change in their laws to harmonise. The 
Parties have the discretionary power to adopt or change the laws and regulations 
whenever they feel the necessity to do so. Therefore, these nonbinding rules along with 
the confidentiality clause relating to the exchange of information give discretionary 
power to the Parties to overlook the agreement. 
3.4. Effectiveness of the Competition Provisions 
 
Given the non–disclosure of data pertaining to the enforcement of competition 
provisions, it is very hard to assess the effectiveness of these provisions. However from 42   
our interviews, we could gather that the chapter dealing with competition provisions is 
seen just as a facilitating chapter which helps in building the mechanism for cooperation. 
The provision requiring the revision of the cooperation pursuant in three years did not 
happen in time but took place on 19
th March 2007. The Parties agreed for technical 
alternations to competition provisions.  However the legal text of the agreement is not yet 
publicly available to assess the developments.  
4. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
4.1. Rationale 
 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has been effective since January 
1, 1994 and is comprised of the United States, Mexico, and Canada. The agreement 
included many aspects of trade such as market access, national treatment, government 
procurement, investment, services and competition policy. In the due time NAFTA has 
established a strong foundation for future growth and has set a valuable example of the 
benefits of trade liberalization. In order to prevent the benefits of free trade from being 
eliminated through (private) anticompetitive behavior the agreement included a chapter 
on competition policy
21.  
4.2. Main Competition Provisions 
 
Chapter 15 of the agreement contains five specific competition related provisions, which 
are discussed in detail below. 
 
a. Competition Law 
Article 1501 of the Chapter 15 states the provisions relating to adoption and enforcement 
measures to proscribe anti competitive business conduct. This requires 
(a)  Each Party to adopt or maintain measures to proscribe anticompetitive business 
 conduct and take appropriate action with respect thereto without however 
 prescribing specific competition standards or rules. 
(b)  The Parties are also required to consult each other regarding the effectiveness of 
 the measures undertaken by each Party 
(c)  Recognising the importance of cooperation and coordination, the Parties agree 
 to cooperate on issues of competition law enforcement policy. The cooperation 
 can take place through mutual legal assistance, notification, consultation and 
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 exchange of information relating to the enforcement of competition laws and 
 policies 
(d)  Parties don’t have recourse to dispute settlement mechanism 
 
b. Monopolies and State Enterprises 
Article 1502 of the Chapter 15 deals with provisions on monopolies and state enterprise. 
The provisions in the agreement don’t prevent any Party from designating a monopoly. 
However it maintains that 
(a)  The Party which designates a monopoly and if the designation affects the 
interest of the other Party then the Party should introduce such conditions on the 
operation of the monopoly so as to nullify or minimize the benefits in the sense 
of Annex 2004 (Nullification and Impairment) 
(b)  The Party shall provide written notification in advance wherever possible to the 
other Party of the designation  
(c)   Each Party shall ensure that  
¾  The designated monopoly acts in a manner that is not inconsistent with the 
Party’s obligations under this agreement 
¾  Acts solely in accordance with commercial considerations in its purchase 
or sale of the monopoly of good or service in the relevant market 
¾  Does not engage in anti competitive practices in a non monopolized 
market in its territory that adversely affect investment of an investor of 
another Party 
¾  Provides non-discriminatory treatment to investments of investors, to 
goods and to service providers of another Party in its purchase or sale of 
the monopoly good or service in the relevant market 
(d)  This provisions don’t apply to government procurement of goods and services 
  for governmental purposes 
 
c. State Enterprises 
Article 1503 in this chapter states about the provisions relating to maintaining and 
establishing state enterprises. The Parties are not prevented from establishing or 
maintaining state enterprises by the provisions in this agreement. However their actions 
are regulated through the following provisions. 
(a)  Each Party should ensure that the state enterprise it maintains or establishes 
don’t act in a manner that is inconsistent with the Party’s obligations under 
chapters dealing with investment and financial services 
(b)  The state enterprises should provide non-discriminatory treatment to the 
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d. Working Group on Trade and Competition 
Article 1504 states that the Commission shall establish a Working Group on Trade and 
Competition, which will make recommendations for further work on the issues 




Article 1505 defines some terms which affect the scope of the agreement. 
4.3. Scope of the Agreement on Competition Provisions 
 
The competition provisions in NAFTA apply to the anticompetitive activities. But with 
the exception of provisions governing the behaviour of state monopolies, the agreement 
doesn’t dictate substantive competition or antitrust rules. It only obliges the Parties to 
have such rules without specifying the measures. 
 
As stated in Article 1502 of the Chapter 15 of this agreement, it appears that NAFTA 
parties are required not only to have such rules but also should ensure that these rules are 
enforced. There is scope for cooperation and consultation. There is provision for 
notification and exchange of information as well. Since the clause on exchange of 
information is not elaborated, it is unlikely that there is any binding on exchanging 
confidential information. NAFTA obligates the Parties to have competition laws and 
apply them without discrimination and does not impose new uniform competition laws on 
the Parties. In comparing the NAFTA with US-Singapore FTA, it can be seen that many 
provisions (like State Enterprises) present in NAFTA have been included in US-
Singapore FTA. 
4.4. Effectiveness of the Competition Provisions 
 
As discussed above, in general the content of the rules is not specified in the agreement 
and hence there can be wide variation among the substantive requirement of the national 
laws. And since NAFTA does not have uniform competition measures, national antitrust 
laws are used by the Parties without any reference to any competition law standard. And 45   
with the lack of dispute settlement mechanism, the competition provisions in NAFTA 
provide a framework for the development of cooperative or collective competition 
policies.  




The Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA 
or the CER agreement) is the main instrument governing economic relations between the 
two countries and entered into force in January 1, 1983.  ANZCERTA was built on a 
series of earlier preferential trade agreements between Australia and New Zealand, 
including the 1966 New Zealand and Australia Free Trade Agreement (NZAFTA). 
 
The ANZCERTA or the CER agreement is more than a free trade agreement, covering 
almost all aspects of the Australia - New Zealand trade and economic relationship. As 
well as underpinning bilateral trade in goods and services, ANZCERTA is the main 
medium for close collaboration across quarantine, customs, transport, regulatory and 
product standards and business law issues. The main objective of Australia New Zealand 
CER is to expand free trade by eliminating barriers to trade and promoting fair 
competition. However like the previous discussed trade agreements the CER agreement 
does include competition provisions in a separate chapter but it has facilitated 
cooperation between Australia and New Zealand on this issue. 
5.2. Main Competition Provisions 
 
There are few competition related provisions found in the CER agreement. These 
provisions are discussed below. 
 
a. Quantitative Import restrictions and Tariff Quotas 
Article 5 of the agreement prohibits all tariffs and quantitative import restrictions on all 
goods originating in the territory of the other member states.  
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b. Other Trade Distorting Factors 
Article 12 of the agreement deals with trade distorting issues. It suggests that the member 
states shall 
(a)  Examine the scope for taking action to harmonize requirements relating to 
relating to such matters as standards, technical specifications and testing 
procedures, domestic labeling and restrictive trade practices 
(b)  Where appropriate, encourage government bodies and other organizations and 
institutions to work towards the harmonization of such requirements. 
(c)  The Member States shall consult at the written request of either with a view to 
resolving any problems which arise from differences between their two 
countries in requirements. 
 
c. Consultation and Review 
Article 22 of the agreement sets out the review and consultation mechanism to ensure the 
satisfactory implementation of the agreement. It includes 
(a)  Ministers of the Member States shall meet annually or otherwise as appropriate 
to review the operation of the Agreement 
(b)  At the written request of either parties, promptly enter into consultations with a 
view to seeking an equitable and mutually satisfactory solution if the Member 
State which requested the consultations considers that: 
¾  an obligation under this Agreement has not been or is not being fulfilled; 
¾  a benefit conferred upon it by this Agreement is being denied; 
¾  the achievement of any objective of this Agreement is being or may be 
frustrated; or 
¾  a case of difficulty has arisen or may arise 
 
It was decided that the Member States should undertake a general review of the 
agreement in 1988. And in the review of ANZCERTA in 1988 a protocol on Acceleration 
of Free Trade on Goods was appended to the Agreement. As per the review Article 4 of 
the ANZCERTA was modified and reads as thus. 
 
d. Anti-dumping 
Article 4 of the revised ANZCERTA states that the member States ‘agree that anti-
dumping measures in respect of goods originating in the territory of the other Member 
States are not appropriate from time of achievement of both free trade in goods between 47   
the Member States on 1 July 1990, and the application of their competition laws to 
relevant anticompetitive conduct affecting trans-Tasman trade in goods’. It further says 
that  ‘each member State shall take such actions as are appropriate to achieve the 
application of its competition law by 1 July, 1990 to anticompetitive conduct affecting 
trans-Tasman trade in a manner consistent with the principles and objectives of the 
agreement’.  
5.3. Scope of the Agreement on Competition Provisions 
 
The ANZCERTA or CER agreement is very important one because of its elimination of 
the anti-dumping clause. Analysis of the CER agreement suggests that both countries 
worked towards deep integration through harmonisation of various laws like business 
law. There is scope for consultation, exchange of information (subject to confidentiality 
clause) and notification in case of anticompetitive conduct. It also provides for extensive 
investigatory power. It was agreed by the Member States that nationals of one state could 
be made the subject of an enquiry by the competition authorities of the other state and be 
required to respond to requests for information. In 1994, the competition authorities 
concluded a bilateral Cooperation and Coordination Agreement to reduce the possibility 
for inconsistencies in the application of legislation in instances where this is not required 
by statutory provisions (WTO, 1996). 
 
However the application of the antitrust remedies remains strictly national. The 
agreement also includes strong disciplines on subsidies as the 1988 protocol says 
‘bounties and subsidies providing long term support can no longer be regarded as a viable 
instrument of industrial policy’. Thus industry specific subsidies are banned along with 
the already banned export subsidies. The Closer Economic Relations (CER) Agreement 
between New Zealand and Australia has been even described by the WTO as the worlds’ 
most comprehensive, effective and mutually compatible free trade agreements. 
5.4. Effectiveness of the Competition Provisions 
 
In 1983, the competition regimes of the two countries differed significantly when 
Australia laws were closer to the US model and New Zealand’s legislation followed the 48   
UK model. In 1996, New Zealand enacted a new legislation which was much closer to 
the Australian system. Although, this was largely motivated by a desire to enhance 
competition in the economy, it also facilitated discussions between the two countries to 
eliminate anti dumping on bilateral trade flows. Consultation took place between 
Australia and New Zealand about ensuring the compatibility of Australian and New 
Zealand evidence law, especially in relation to business records and secondary evidence, 
in the context of enactment of new evidence legislation by Australia and examination of 
possible evidence reforms by the New Zealand Law Commission. 
6. US-Korea Free Trade Agreement 
6.1. Rationale 
 
The U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement is a trade agreement between the US and the 
Republic of Korea. Negotiations were announced on February 2, 2006 and were 
concluded on April 1, 2007. The final text which has not yet been made public will soon 
be sent to Congress for legislative approval. The FTA includes many aspects such as 
trade in services, national treatment, government procurement, investment and 
competition policy. The objective of including competition related provisions was to 
promote economic efficiency and consumer welfare. 
6.2. Main Competition Provisions  
 
Chapter 16 of the agreement deals with competition related matters relating to trade. The 
main provisions are as thus. 
 
a. Competition Law and Anti Competition Business Conduct 
Article 16.1 of the Chapter 16 states that  
(a)  Each Party shall maintain or adopt competition laws to proscribe 
anticompetitive business conduct.  
(b)  Each Party shall maintain an authority or authorities responsible for the 
enforcement of its national competition laws. The enforcement policy of each 
Party’s authorities should be non-discriminatory  49   
(c)  The Parties recognize the importance of cooperation and coordination for 
effective competition law enforcement. Accordingly, the Parties shall cooperate 
in relation to their enforcement policies and in the enforcement of their 
respective competition laws, including through mutual assistance, notification, 
consultation and exchange of information. 
 
b. Designated Monopolies 
Article 16.2 deals with the issue of designated monopoly. Though it suggests that nothing 
in this agreement prevents any Party from designating monopoly, it adds that 
(a)    Each Party shall ensure that any privately-owned /government monopoly 
designated after the date of entry into force of this Agreement  
 
¾  acts in a manner that is not inconsistent with the Party’s obligations under this 
Agreement  
¾  acts solely in accordance with commercial considerations in its purchase or 
sale of the monopoly good or service in the relevant market  
¾  provides non-discriminatory treatment to covered investments, to goods of the 
other Party, and to service suppliers of the other Party in its purchase or sale 
of the monopoly good or service in the relevant market and  
¾  does not use its monopoly position to engage, either directly or indirectly, in 
anticompetitive practices in a non-monopolized market in its territory, where 
such practices adversely affect covered investments. 
(b)  This article however does not apply to government procurement 
 
c. State Enterprises 
Article 16.3 presents provisions related to state enterprises. The Parties are not prevented 
from establishing or maintaining state enterprises. However they should ensure that the 
enterprises 
(a)  acts in a manner that is not inconsistent with the Party’s obligations under this 
Agreement  
(b)  accords non-discriminatory treatment in the sale of its goods or services to 
covered interests 50   
d. Differences in Pricing 
Article 16.4 suggests the scope of the operation of Article 16.2 and 16.3. It says that these 
provisions should not prevent the monopoly or state enterprise from charging different 




The Parties recognise the value of transparency as mentioned under Article 16.5. The 
Parties on request are required to make available public information concerning 
(a)  competition law enforcement activities;  
(b)  state enterprises and government or privately-owned designated monopolies, at 
any level of government, provided that requests for such information shall 
indicate the entities involved, specify the particular products and markets 
concerned, and include some indicia that these entities may be engaging in 
practices that may hinder trade or investment between the Parties; and  
(c)  exemptions and immunities to its competition laws, provided that requests for 
such information shall specify the particular goods and markets of concern, and 
include indicia that the exemptions and immunities may hinder trade or 
investment between the Parties 
(d)  The Parties in addition should ensure that decisions and orders get published. 
 
f. Cross Border Consumer Protection 
Article 16.6 brings out the provisions related to consumer welfare. The specific 
provisions are  
(a)  The Parties shall cooperate, in appropriate cases of mutual concern, in the 
 enforcement of their consumer protection laws in order to enhance consumer 
 welfare.  
(b)  The Parties shall endeavor to strengthen cooperation between the U.S. Federal 
 Trade Commission, and the Korea Ministry of Finance and Economy and the 
 Korea Fair Trade Commission in areas of mutual concern relating to their 
 respective consumer protection laws, including  51   
¾  consulting in the fields of consumer policy and exchanging information 
related to the enactment and administration of their consumer protection 
laws;  
¾  strengthening cooperation to tackle the fraudulent and deceptive 
commercial practices against consumers;  
¾  consulting on ways to reduce consumer protection law violations that have 
significant cross-border dimensions; and  
¾  supporting the implementation of the OECD Guidelines for Protecting 
Consumers from Fraudulent and Deceptive Commercial Practices Across 
Borders of 2003.  
 
(c)   Nothing in this Article may limit the discretion of an agency to decide whether 
to take action in response to a request by a counterpart agency of the other Party  
(d)   Each Party shall endeavor to identify, and shall consider modifying its domestic 
framework to overcome such obstacles 
 
g. Consultations 
Article 16.7 states that to foster understanding between the Parties, or to address specific 
matters that arise under this Chapter 
(a)  Each Party shall, on request of the other Party, enter into consultations 
regarding representations made by the other Party. The Party shall indicate, in 
the request, how the matter affects trade or investment between the Parties. 
(b)   The Party to which a request for consultations has been addressed shall accord 
full and sympathetic consideration to the concerns raised by the other Party.  
(c)   During the consultations under this Article, each Party shall endeavor to provide 
relevant non-confidential information to the other Party in order to facilitate the 
discussion aspects of the matter which is the subject of consultation.  
 
h. Dispute Settlement 
Article 16.8 defines that the Parties do not have recourse to dispute settlement under this 
Agreement for any matter arising under Articles 16.1, 16.6 or 16.7.  
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i. Definitions 
Article 16.9 provides the definitions of the terms used in this chapter which eventually 
affects the scope of the agreement. 
6.3. Scope of the Agreement on Competition Provisions 
 
The Chapter 16 covers many competition related provisions. As found in the other 
bilateral trade agreements involving US, this agreement also includes provisions related 
to state enterprises, monopolies and transparency. The agreement allows for mutual 
assistance, consultation, notification and exchange of information in enforcement 
activities. However the scope again gets limited with only allowing publicly available 
information. This implies that any kind of confidential information can not be disclosed 
to the other Party. This is the only agreement studied so far in this report that includes 
competition provisions related to consumer welfare. Even there is sectoral application of 
dispute settlement mechanism to provisions related to state enterprises, government 
monopolies and transparency.  
6.4. Effectiveness of the Competition Provisions 
 
The provisions are yet to get the legal review and hence have not been implemented till 
now.  
7. Summary of the Case Studies 
 
All the bilateral agreements studied in this report generally include soft laws on the issue 
of competition implying that they are not compulsory on the contracting Parties to 
implement within their domestic laws. They include matters related to cooperation in 
enforcement, exchange of non-confidential information, notification of actions etc. The 
provisions don’t require changes in the Parties domestic laws. One important feature was 
that there is a clear division of agreements falling into two categories. The agreements 
with US as one signatory include provisions related to state enterprises and monopolies 
where as agreements with EU emphasis more on issues related to cooperation and 
coordination of enforcement activities and technical assistance.  53   
8. Pros and Cons of Competition Provisions in Trade Agreements 
 
The limited use of the competition provisions in the agreements makes the assessment 
about the potential benefits and limitations more difficult. Though the provisions are 
generally non-binding in nature; in the absence of any consensus among nations as to the 
objectives, forms and enforcement processes of competition laws; such an agreement 
helps in creating the framework for cooperation. According to Marsden and Whelan 
(2005) the EU-Mexico agreement has been successful in putting in place the mechanism 
for cooperation which can be used by the anti trust authorities of the parties to address 
any future anti competitive behaviour affecting important interests of either party. This 
seems to be the key reason for inclusion of competition provisions in trade agreements. It 
is expected that the need for cooperation and communication will lead to a deeper 
understanding of each others competition regimes.  
 
It is again pointed out that provisions relating to notification are very important as they 
can send early warnings of anticompetitive activities .Marsden and Whelan (2005) feel 
‘notification sends a clear signal to undertakings that competition authorities are both 
willing and able to communicate with one another and thus that national borders can no 
longer be relied upon as protection against enforcement activities’. Consultations 
between the competition agencies provide an opportunity to one agency to offer its 
support, advice and experience to its counterpart. Notification also helps the authorities to 
compare notes about particular cases and the provisions for technical assistance can be 
very helpful particularly for developing counties in capacity building.  
 
As mentioned earlier, the competition provisions included in the trade agreements are 
soft law obligations which are not legally binding on the parties. The parties don’t suffer 
any legal sanction for refusal to comply with the provisions of the chapter.  In most cases 
the Parties also do not have any recourse to the dispute settlement procedures of the FTA 
for an alleged violation of any of the competition provisions. It has therefore been argued 
that the absence of sanctions and dispute settlement procedures makes the competition 
provisions less effective. The other major limitation to the effectiveness of competition 
provisions is the constraint on the exchange of confidential information. As per the stated 54   
provision on exchange of information, the Parties can only get the already available 
public information.  
VI. Competition Provisions in other Chapters of FTAs 
 
It has been observed by many (eg. Anderson and Evenett, 2006) that some competition 
related provisions are there in the non-competition specific chapters of the trade 
agreements. Anderson and Evenett (2006) while analysing trade agreements of US-Chile, 
EC-Chile, Canada-Costa Rica, Caribbean Community-Caricom and US-Singapore, found 
that competition provisions are increasingly used in non-competition specific chapters, 
and in particular chapters on the general obligations of the Parties, on state enterprises 
and on regulated industries. Therefore they point out that ‘whether or not the trade 
agreement has a designated chapter dealing specifically with competition policy, is not 
necessarily a reliable guide as to potential impact of competition language codified in a 
trade agreement’. In this context, while analysing the FTAs we also found the following 
competition provisions in non-competition specific chapters. 
1. Singapore-Japan New Age Economic Partnership 
 
Singapore-Japan New Age Economic Partnership deals with competition provisions in a 
specific Chapter i.e. Chapter 12. In addition to that some competition related provisions 
are also found in the non specific chapters like in Chapter 7 dealing with trade in 
services. Again it was observed that Annex IVB dealing with telecommunication 
Services do have certain competition provisions.  
1.1. Chapter 7 (Trade in Services) 
 
Article 65 dealing with monopolies and exclusive service suppliers states that the 
monopoly supplier of a service in its territory should not act in a manner inconsistent 
with the Party’s specific commitments. It further says where a Party’s monopoly supplier 
competes in the supply of a service outside the scope of its monopoly rights, the Party 
shall ensure that such a supplier does not abuse its monopoly position to act in its 
territory in a manner inconsistent with such commitments. 55   
 
Article 66 on business practices has provisions on consultations, negative comity and 
exchange of information. It states that 
(a)  The Parties recognize that certain business practices of service suppliers, other 
than those falling under Article 65 above, may restrain competition and thereby 
restrict trade in services. 
 
(b)  A Party shall, at the request of the other Party, enter into consultations with a 
view to eliminating practices referred to in paragraph 1 above. The Party 
addressed shall accord full and sympathetic consideration to such a request and 
shall co-operate through the supply of publicly available non confidential 
information of relevance to the matter in question.  
1.2. Annex IVB (Telecommunications Services) 
 
The clauses on competitive safeguards deal with anticompetitive practices in the 
telecommunication sector. It suggests that 
 
(a)  Each Party shall maintain appropriate measures for the purpose of preventing 
suppliers, who alone or together are a major supplier, from engaging in or 
continuing anti-competitive practices. 
 
(b)  The anti-competitive practices referred to in paragraph 1 above shall include in 
particular 
 
¾  Engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidization or pricing services in a 
manner that gives rise to unfair competition; 
¾  Discriminating unfairly in providing telecommunications services; 
¾  Using information obtained from competitors with anticompetitive results; 
and 
¾  Not making available to other service suppliers on a timely basis technical 
information about essential facilities and commercially relevant information 
which are necessary for them to provide services. 
 
(c)  Each Party may, in accordance with its laws and regulations, determine the 
appropriate level of regulation required to promote fair competition 
 
This implies that the competition provisions included in the FTA are soft laws as the 
Parties have the discretionary power to formulate and implement laws on their own. Any 
failing on the part of the Parties in promoting fair competition does not invoke legal 
action. 
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2. US –Singapore FTA  
 
The US-Singapore FTA includes competition provisions in a specific chapter i.e. Chapter 
12 to deal with the anticompetitive conducts of firms. In addition to this the following 
competition provisions were found in the non competitive chapters. 
2.1. Chapter 9 (Telecommunications) 
 
Article 9.4 provides the competitive safeguards relating to the conduct of major suppliers.  
It states that 
 
(a)  Each Party shall maintain appropriate measures for the purpose of preventing 
suppliers of public telecommunications services who, alone or together, are a 
major supplier in its territory from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive 
practices. 
 
(b)  For purposes of above paragraph, anti-competitive practices include: 
 
¾  Engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidization; 
¾  Using information obtained from competitors with anti-competitive results; 
and 
¾  Not making available, on a timely basis, to suppliers of public 
telecommunications services, technical information about essential facilities 
and commercially relevant information that is necessary for them to provide 
public telecommunications 
2.2. Chapter 15 (Investment) 
 
Article 15.14 has provisions on consultation and negotiation. It suggests that 
 
(a)  In the event of an investment dispute, the claimant and the respondent should 
initially seek to resolve the dispute through consultation and negotiation, which 
may include the use of nonbinding, third-party procedures. 
 
The above analysis suggests the presence of competition provisions in non competition 
specific chapters. However it is observed that the competition specific chapters are more 
advanced in their provisions to foster cooperation between competition agencies in the 
enforcement activities. Moreover as pointed out by Anderson and Evenett (2006), the 
competition specific chapters are structured in a certain way so as to strengthen the 
competition agencies by providing technical assistance.  57   
VII. Evidence of Competition Enforcement 
 
There has been a general feeling that the competition provisions in trade agreements 
don’t have much importance or value as the competition law enforcement officials don’t 
make use of them. The objective of this section is to review some cases where the 
competition clauses have been applied. UNCTAD (2006) stated “By examining the 
cooperation experience, the aim is to evaluate to what extent:  
a)  The existence of competition provisions in International agreements has been 
crucial to foster cooperation between agencies on actual enforcement cases 
b)  It is important that the competition provisions are duly designed and phrased in 
such a way those they indeed allow cooperation to take place, when desired and/ 
or requested. 
c)  Informal cooperation can play a role 
d)  Whether having binding enforcement provisions would have changed the 
outcome of the cooperation. 
e)  Positive outcomes resulted from the cooperation 
 
In this context we have looked at one case in Republic of Korea. Republic of Korea 
possesses a relatively young national competition authority but has most experience of 
cooperating with foreign jurisdictions for cracking international cartels. The case in 
which Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) reports prosecution after receiving 
international cooperation is the international graphite electrode cartel.  
 
The Graphite Electrode Cartel 
In the international graphite electrodes cartel, the main graphite manufactures from 
countries like the US, Germany and Japan collaborated and implemented price fixing 
practices during 1992-98. Graphite electrodes are used primarily in the production of 
steel in electric arc furnaces. These leading companies had over 80% of the market share 
and could manage to maintain the cartel for six years from 1992 to 1998. As a result of 
this cartel, the world prices of graphite electrodes increased by more that 50 percent.  
 
KFTC faced many problems in starting the investigation and securing substantial 
information as the cartel companies didn’t hold affiliates or overseas branches in Korea 58   
which is mandatory for investigating international cartels. Therefore the KFTC 
investigation heavily depended on the information provided voluntarily by the cartel 
participants located overseas. Again during this time KFTC didn’t have any bilateral 
agreement of cooperation with a foreign competition authority. However the US and the 
EU provided informal cooperation in the form of providing their publicly available data 
and it is believed that they cooperated to the full extent permitted under their national 
laws.  However the publicly available information was not of significant help in carrying 
out investigations. Though KFTC was successful in concluding this investigation and in 
March 2002 convicted six graphite electrode manufacturers from the United States, 
Germany and Japan, to overcome the problems in cooperation, the KFTC started to build 
cooperative relationships with foreign competition authorities. In September 2002, the 
KFTC made bilateral agreement with Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) which includes cooperation provisions on enforcement activities, notification 
etc. In February 2003, Korea-Chile FTA was signed and cooperation provisions on 
competition policy were included in it. Since then it has concluded FTAs with the US and 
has a chapter on cooperation provisions in competition related issues.  
The above discussion implies that though informal cooperation is possible in case of 
need, there is a requirement for cooperation agreements or agreements should also focus 
on cooperation in competition provisions.  
VII. Case for India 
 
Recently most countries of the world have intensified the formation of free trade 
agreements (FTAs) with other countries including India. India now has agreements with 
Sri Lanka, Bhutan, Chile,Singapore and Myanmar. Negotiations are going on for 
agreements with ASEAN, GCC, China, MERCOSUR etc. These FTAs in general 
emphasise on goods with some ( for example, the CECA with Singapore) including the 
services sector as well. The more substantial FTA is called the Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement (CECA), such as the one with Singapore. Though the FTAs vary 
in sectors covered in each of them, none of the FTAs signed by India include competition 
provisions. Even the CECA with Singapore which covers many sectors like trade in 59   
goods, services, investment and government procurement, does not include trade related 
competition provisions.  
 
This section therefore explores the case for India to include competition provisions in the 
future trade agreements as India has been able to formulate its national competition law. 
The Competition Act, 2002 was framed with the objective of preventing anticompetitive 
practices and promoting competition in the market. The Act contains exhaustive 
provisions related to prohibition of anticompetitive agreements, abuse of dominant 
position and regulation of combinations. Therefore it is important to see if it is beneficial 
to have competition provisions in the future trade agreements and if so then what kind of 
provisions should be included. 
1. Position on Trade and Competition at WTO 
 
In the multilateral context India has submitted few papers to the WTO Working Group on 
Trade and Competition Policy. The most recent position paper (WT/WGTCP/W/216) 
objects to the application of National Treatment (NT), transparency and procedural 
fairness. However the paper put down some conditions under which it would subscribe to 
a multilateral competition agreement. The paper stated that ‘until such time as developed 
countries are willing to consider the impact of mergers on consumers in foreign 
countries, to rescind the exemption of export cartels in their competition laws, to give 
serious consideration to enforcing the UNCTAD Set of measures to control RBPs and to 
extend the benefits of “positive comity” in competition law enforcement to developing 
countries, the latter will have to retain the right to challenge foreign mergers and RBPs 
that have an effect on domestic consumers’
22.  
 
The main concern of India’s viewpoint was applying National Treatment (NT) to 
competition policy. The paper pointed out that ‘a competition policy that ostensibly 
applies to all members equally is likely in practice to discriminate against firms in 
developing countries. Since prosecuting RBPs perpetrated by firms based abroad is 
going to be extremely difficult for countries with limited resources, domestic producers 
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will in practice bear the brunt of competition law that enshrines the NT principle, while 
allowing foreign producers to get away with similar infractions’
23. 
 
Though India recognises the importance of transparency and procedural fairness in 
international trade, it is skeptical about their application in the context of competition 
policy. According to India’s view, transparency in terms of single interpretation of the 
rules in every country is not possible. Also it is very difficult for the enforcing agencies 
to get vital information from firms having foreign bases and protected by their 
governments in the name of commercial confidentiality. In such a situation maintaining 
transparency and procedural fairness becomes difficult. 
2. Additional Commitments: Reference Paper on Telecommunications 
 
In the telecommunications sector, GATS annexed a special agreement providing more 
specific rights and obligations for that sector. In addition the Reference Paper spelled out 
a detailed set of competition rules for prevention of anticompetitive practices in the 
telecommunications sector. It acknowledged that 
¾  Appropriate measures shall be maintained for the purpose of preventing suppliers 
who, alone or together, are a major supplier from engaging in or continuing anti-
competitive practices.   
¾  The anti-competitive practices referred to above shall include in particular:   
(a)  engaging in anti-competitive cross-subsidization;   
(b)  using information obtained from competitors with anti-competitive results;  and   
(c)  not making available to other services suppliers on a timely basis technical 
information about essential facilities and commercially relevant information 
which are necessary for them to provide services. 
 
While majority of the WTO members accepted it entirely, India has accepted partially 
and also with certain modifications. Text of India’s revised offer states 
(a)  Appropriate measures shall be maintained for the purpose of preventing service 
suppliers from engaging in or continuing in anti-competitive practices of the 
following type: 
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¾  using information obtained from competitors with anti-competitive results; 
and 
¾  not making available to other services suppliers on a timely basis technical 
information about essential facilities and commercially relevant 
information which are necessary for them to provide services. 
 
This shows that India has not given a general commitment not to engage in anti-
competitive cross subsidization. It has been observed that there is reluctance on the part 
of India for a multilateral framework on competition provisions. India’s submission also 
seems to indicate a desire to restrict general application of competition laws to the service 
sector. 
3. Competition Related Provisions in India’s FTA 
 
As we have observed in case of US-Singapore and Japan-Singapore FTAs, some 
competition elements are also included in chapters not dealing with competition 
provisions. In this context we have analysed few FTAs of India to see if they include 
competition related provisions.  
3.1. India-Singapore CECA  
 
India-Singapore CECA was successfully concluded and was signed on 29 June 2005.  
This agreement is India's first ever CECA and Singapore's first comprehensive bilateral 
economic agreement with a South Asian economy.  The Agreement encompasses trade in 
goods, trade in services, investment protection and other features. Also it has co-
operation clauses in several sectors such as  economic co-operation in areas like 
education, science, technology, air services and intellectual property. However, the 
agreement doesn’t contain any specific chapter on competition provisions. 
 
The India-Singapore CECA however, includes articles on transparency, notification, 
consultation, cooperation and exchange of information in other sectors. A detailed 
discussion on these issues is carried out to find the link to competition laws.  
 
a. Main Provisions (Chapter 7- Trade in Services) 62   
Article 7.12 dealing with monopolies and exclusive service suppliers states that where a 
Party's monopoly supplier competes, either directly or through an affiliated company, in 
the supply of a service outside the scope of its monopoly rights and which is subject to 
that Party's Schedule of specific commitments, the Party shall ensure that such a supplier 
does not abuse its monopoly position to act in its territory in a manner inconsistent with 
such commitments. 
 
Article 7.13 on business practices relates to anti competitive business practice and 
consultations. It states that  
  The Parties recognize that certain business practices of service suppliers, other 
than those falling under Article 7.12, may restrain competition and thereby 
restrict trade in services.  
  A Party shall, at the request of the other Party, enter into consultations with a 
view to eliminating practices referred to in paragraph one. 
 
Article 7.15 deals with issues on subsidies and suggests that, 
  In the event that either Party considers that its interests have been adversely 
affected by a subsidy or grant provided by the other Party, upon request, the 
other Party shall enter into consultations with a view to resolving the matter 
  The provisions of Chapter 15 ( Dispute Settlement) of this Agreement shall 
not apply to any requests made or consultations held under the provisions of 
this subsidy article or to any disputes that may arise between the Parties out 
of, or under, the provisions of this article. 
 
In the E-Commerce sector both sides commit to ensuring transparency by making 
publicly available all relevant laws and regulations affecting electronic commerce. 
Though clause of transparency and exchange of information are cited in the agreement 
but their nature is general and not specifically pertaining to competition. 
3.2. India-Sri Lanka FTA 
 
India-Sri Lanka FTA has been operational since March 1, 2000. The agreement included 
mechanisms for review and consultations. 
 
a. Main Provisions 63   
Article I says that the objective of the FTA is to provide fair conditions of competition for 
trade between India and Sri Lanka. Article VIII- Safeguard Measures elaborate the point 
of consultation when any imported product from the other Party threatens to 
cause serious injury to contracting party. In case action needs to be taken, it shall be 
simultaneously notified to the other Contracting Party and the Joint Committee 
established in terms of Article XI. The Committee shall enter into consultations with the 
concerned Contracting Party and endeavour to reach mutually acceptable agreement to 
remedy the situation. If the consultations in the Committee fail to resolve the issue within 
sixty days, the party affected by such action shall have the right to withdraw the 
preferential treatment.  
 
Article XI states that the Committee shall accord adequate opportunities for consultation 
on representations made by any Contracting Party with respect to any matter affecting the 
implementation of the Agreement. Article XII on Consultations states that the Party can 
consult with respect to any matter affecting the operation of this Agreement. 
3.3. India-Korea CEPA 
 
South Korea hopes to wrap up a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement 
(CEPA) with India by December 2007. At least six rounds of negotiations have been held 
between the two sides. The Indo-Korea Joint Study Group (JSG) has recommended that 
India and Korea should enter into a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement 
(CEPA) covering, trade in goods, services; promotion, facilitation and liberalization of 
investment flow etc. 
 
The JSG recommends that Korea and India should: 
  Ensure  transparency in related laws and regulations in their countries and 
regularly exchange information between the customs authorities of both countries 
(Para 5.13.) 
  Facilitate  exchange of information and maintenance of transparency on their 
respective technical trade measures and regulations, technical standards and 
assessment procedures related to health and safety. 
  The financial services authorities of both sides could enter into mutual 
consultation with a view to increasing cooperation in these areas. (Para 3.36) 64   
 
The above discussion suggests the presence of competition related provisions relating to 
cooperation and consultation.  
 
4. Incorporating Competition Provisions in FTAs 
 
India like many other developing countries is not in favour of a multilateral agreement on 
competition policy. However as discussed in the previous sections, it was found that 
many countries though not in favour of the multilateral framework, have embarked upon 
bilateral and regional agreements on competition policy.  
 
The literature (Alvarez et. al, 2005) suggests that the inclusion of competition provisions 
in trade agreements has been beneficial for developing countries as they stand to lose 
more from anticompetitive practices of MNCs. In general developing countries benefit 
mainly from two types of competition provisions such as cooperation in enforcement 
activities and technical assistance. Brazil has been greatly benefited from the bilateral 
cooperation through its agreement with the US. Technical assistance through an 
agreement with a developed country can help the developing country by increasing their 
expertise in the field of competition laws and policy.  
 
The analysis of India’s submissions to WTO suggests that though India  is interested in a 
global mechanism which would discipline restrictive business practices that might affect 
it, it is concerned about the application of national treatment provisions. But the 
application of national treatment to a competition law does not automatically establish a 
right to market access. Market access is controlled by tariff commitments (GATT) and 
specific commitments (GATS). The Article II of the GATT agreement provides Members 
the means of domestic protection by the use of tariff duties.   Also to ensure that domestic 
protection is not distorted by internal laws, GATT national treatment is a general 
obligation which applies to all domestic laws, regulations and requirements that affect the 
internal sale, offering for sale, distribution etc of imported goods. Hence the GATT 
principle of national treatment also applies to the domestic competition law.  However 
the existing national treatment (based on EC proposal) in trade agreements on 65   
competition policy suggests an obligation to prevent discrimination between firms and 
not products on the basis of nationality. Thus the application of national treatment 
provision would no longer be limited to trade related issues. The scope of national 
treatments thus raises India’s concerns and this has been shared by many counterparts. 
The national treatment provisions would require the law to treat all India and foreign 
firms equally. However the MNCs coming to India have got more advantages than the 
domestic players in terms of capacity to invest and lower capital cost. Hence the domestic 
players need to be given some incentives to compete against the MNCs. Also there was 
no consensus at the WTO Working Group discussions on the national treatment provision 
in competition policy. In this context, India should desist from negotiating on a national 
treatment provision under competition policy in its future trade agreements. In the 
analysis of trade agreements on competition policy it was found that only few agreements 
like US-Chile have got very broad non-discrimination provisions.  
 
The next issue in a competition policy framework is transparency. As discussed at the 
WTO Working Group and implemented by other trade agreements, the focus is primarily 
on  de jure transparency which applies to laws, rules and guidelines of general 
application. The transparency principle already exists in some WTO agreements like 
GATS. However the transparency used in most trade agreements is very limited in scope 
and applies generally to the provision of state aid. So including transparency provision in 
a competition policy framework should not be an issue for India.  The other important 
provision is principles of cooperation. Cooperation in the form of information sharing, 
technical assistance, positive comity would be helpful in investigation against 
anticompetitive practices like international cartel. However, as evidenced from other 
trade agreements, only provisions related to exchange of non-confidential information 
should be negotiated. The provisions relating to collecting data and materials pertaining 
to a particular anticompetitive practice would be burdensome in terms of cost. So it is 
advisable to negotiate for compensation while negotiating with a developed country. 
From India’s point of view, provisions on technical assistance in an agreement with a 
developed country would be very useful. Technical assistance in the form of providing 
training to the officials, work shops, sharing of experience would be valuable for India. 66   
The help in terms of technical assistance through a trade agreement would help in 
improving the enforcement capacity of India’s national competition law. 
 
The other substantive issues of competition policy are providing state aid and regulation 
of government monopolies. Given that all the sectors in India have not been fully 
liberalized and many sectors are still subsidized, it may not be feasible for India to give 
any commitments on state aid and government monopoly.  
 
The above analysis implies that India should focus on including competition provisions 
related to transparency, cooperation, consultation and technical assistance. Some of these 
provisions (eg. consultation) are already present in other chapters (e.g. trade in services, 
India-Singapore CECA) of India’s FTAs. The case studies and literature survey had 
suggested that the trade agreements while including competition policy either follow the 
EU model (importance on cooperation, technical assistance) or the US model (focus on 
substantive rules, state enterprises, monopolies). Therefore it would be viable for India to 
follow an EU style agreement while negotiating competition related provisions in 
bilateral trade treaties. 
 
5. Role of National Competition Policy and CCI in India 
 
In the post reform era in India, one important issue is to ensure and manage competition 
in the market to derive benefits from the process of economic liberalisation. In order to 
achieve the goal of maintaining competition and prohibiting anti-competitive practices in 
the economy, the Competition Act of 2002 (with some amendments in 2007) was 
formulated and Competition Commission of India was entrusted with the task of ensuring 
its implementation. The overall goal of the competition law in India is to maintain the 
competition process and ensure effective competition in the market. Therefore the 
Competition Act 2002 prohibits anti competitive agreements, abuse of dominance 
position and regulates combinations having an adverse impact on competition. The 
achievement of this goal would act as a catalyst for the achievement of the economy’s 
economic well being through increased competition, innovation, increasing consumer 
choice etc. However, since the policies of central government, state governments and 67   
local bodies affect the competition structure of the economy, there is a need for a 
National Competition Policy to ensure competition in the market. In this context the mid-
term appraisal of 9
th five year plan states that ‘there is an urgent need of articulating 
National Competition Policy in India to bring about a spirit and culture of competition 
among enterprises and economic enterprises to maximize economic efficiency and to 
protect and to promote consumer’s interest and society’s welfare and improve our 
international competitiveness’. Therefore, the proposed National Competition Policy in 
India has the additional objectives to  
¾  Promote competition so as to achieve economic efficiency and maximize 
consumer welfare 
¾  Promote competition culture through competition advocacy 
¾  Facilitate harmonisation of laws and policies of central and state governments 
relating to competition 
¾  Ensure competition in the regulated sectors 
The National Competition Policy should aim at increasing the local economy 
competitiveness. In the process it is thought that the competition policy would 
significantly contribute to the economic development of the economy. 
 
5.1. Role of National Competition Policy 
One important tenet of competition policy is to support the pro competitive reform 
agenda of the economy. Therefore one of the challenges of the National Competition 
Policy in establishing the market competition would be to interact with other economic 
policies affecting the liberalisation process in India. The related policies may include 
those relating to ‘infrastructure, international trade, FDI, investment, intellectual property 
rights, financial markets and privatisation’.
24  
 
In the corporate structure in India, restructuring has mainly taken place through 
consolidation. In the consolidation process there is quite active presence of MNCs in the 
merger acquisition process. At this moment the MNCs seem to have undue advantage 
over domestic firms due to higher investment capacity and relatively cheaper access to 
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capital. In such a situation there is the every possibility of MNCs engaging in unfair trade 
practices prohibited in other countries with competition legislation. Similarly the MNCs 
could try predatory pricing to eliminate competition from the domestic market and in the 
later stage that will have negative impact on consumer welfare. This requires a proper 
application of competition policy to reap the benefits of liberalisation. Also in India 
though privatisation was the principal task of economic reform in early 1990s, still the 
state retains substantial interests in many sectors. The state owned entities get special 
government aid and hence distort competition Therefore, when developing the state aid 
policy, the relevance of competition law and policy should be taken into consideration. 
 
There are certain other economic policies such as trade, foreign investment regional 
regulation, which may have implications which are not favourable for enhancement of 
market competition. One such policy is antidumping rules, the implementation of which 
can have anticompetitive effect. But since antidumping also includes a series of trade 
provisions that aim at helping domestic industries to cope with import competition, these 
rules  generally don’t clash with competition provisions. However, anti dumping duties 
do militate against domestic consumers. On the other hand, anti dumping duties are 
meant to help domestic companies  against the long term anti-competitive behaviour of 
foreign companies/countries. A general regulator like the Competition Commission is 
supposed to balance the interests of consumers and producers but give special attention to 
the former. However, given the present status of anti-dumping duties in India, it is 
unlikely that inclusion of anti dumping activities in the purview of the Competition 
Commission ( or RTAs) would be considered politically acceptable. 
 
In a period of free trade and globalisation, the Central and State governments of India 
have the power to put restrictions on movement of goods, services and capital among 
different states of India in the public interest. There are layers of taxation policy to be 
followed in case of internal trade. This reduces the level of competition in the market. 
The abuse of intellectual property rights should be another important sphere of 
competition policy.  
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The above discussed anti competitive practices adversely affect the economic 
development of an economy. Therefore the National competition Policy should try to 
address the anticompetitive practices and harmonise all other economic policies to foster 
competition. The Working Group Report on Competition Policy
25 suggests that the goals 
of Eleventh Five Year Plan could be achieved by promoting and strengthening 
competition in the following sectors:  
¾  Agriculture  
¾  Industry/Manufacturing: Labour Market, SSI Reservation, Infrastructure (Power), 
Transport, Education and Drinking Water 
The development of National Competition Policy should try to raise the awareness about 
protecting and fostering competition. The policy should describe the principles contained 
in the law, the advantages of implementing it and about the role of the competition 
authority in implementing it. Also any deviations from the competition principles should 
be notified. This would increase transparency and bring accountability to the system.  
 
5.2. Role of Competition Authority 
The Competition Commission of India is required to ensure the effective implementation 
of the competition law which aims to prohibit practices having adverse impact on 
competition and in addition should undertake competition advocacy to create public 
awareness of the benefits of competition. Also as discussed earlier, there has been 
growing evidence/interest in including competition related provisions in bilateral and 
regional trade agreements. In this context, the competition commission would assist the 
government bodies assigned with the implementation of these agreements in interpreting 
and applying these provisions. There have also been instances of cooperation agreements 
among competition authorities (US- Brazil), which enable the countries to cooperate in 
case of anticompetitive practices affecting their trade. 
IX. Conclusions 
 
In recent times competition related provisions in bilateral/regional trade agreements have 
emerged as the most intensely debated subject. The failure to include competition 
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provisions at the WTO multilateral framework provided the scope for including their 
inclusion at bilateral/regional level. The rationale behind their inclusion has been to 
prevent the deterioration of the benefits of free trade by private anticompetitive activities. 
There are almost 143 trade agreements which include competition provisions. 
 
This study analyses the specific competition provisions in bilateral free trade agreements 
focusing on the type, scope and effectiveness. This was analysed in the context of 
drawing lessons for India, in negotiating future trade agreements. The analysis suggests 
that the trade agreements generally fall into either of the two broad categories of EU style 
and the US style agreements. The EU style agreements put more importance on 
cooperation mechanism for enforcement activities and technical assistance. However the 
US style agreements are oriented towards substantive rules on transparency, monopolies, 
state enterprises and dispute settlement. 
 
Another feature of the trade agreements suggests that the competition provisions included 
belong to the category of soft laws. These are not legally binding and are in general out of 
the purview of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The scope of incorporating 
competition provisions is greater than generally observed, as many non competition 
specific chapters of some trade agreements (US-Singapore) also include competition 
related provisions. 
 
The major difficulty is encountered while analysing the effectiveness of these 
competition provisions. Given that some of the agreements are very recent and the lack of 
publicly available data along with the limited empirical research on the implementation 
of competition provisions, it is difficult to quantify the success rate relating to 
implementation. Notwithstanding this, many signatories (e.g. Brazil, Korea) find the 
provisions related to cooperation and technical assistance  quite useful.  
 
India has been reluctant in formulating a multilateral framework on competition laws. In 
general, the objection are related to the unwillingness to overload an already over 
burdened WTO agenda in the Doha round. More specifically, India’s concerns are related 
to the provisions on National Treatment (NT), transparency and procedural fairness. As 71   
we have seen from the case studies, these provisions are generally not included in EU 
style trade agreements. Therefore, India should consider including competition provisions 
related to cooperation and technical assistance in its future negotiating strategy for RTAs. 
 
In including Competition provisions in RTAs the main problem lies in setting up a 
dispute settlement mechanism. By definition, provisions of the Competition laws of 
countries are applicable to firms so that the standard dispute settlement mechanism of the 
WTO is not relevant: only governments can be parties in the dispute settlement 
mechanism of the WTO. On the other hand, countries are unwilling to give up their 
national jurisdiction over companies even in regional trading arrangements. It is unlikely 
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